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1. Introduction  
In his 1960 paper “The Problem of Social Cost,” Ronald Coase famously observed 
that, in a world with zero transactions costs, negotiation among interested parties can 
overcome the inefficiencies otherwise caused by externalities.1  This is sometimes 
referred to as Coase’s “efficiency proposition.”  Coase further argued that, in this 
frictionless world, the assignment of legal entitlements or obligations would not affect the 
ultimate allocation of resources, and therefore the efficiency of this allocation.2  This is 
sometimes known as Coase’s “invariance proposition.”3   
These two propositions collectively make up the so-called Coase Theorem. Thus, for 
example, in the absence of transaction costs, it is irrelevant whether we give a 
manufacturer the “right to pollute” or we give the adjoining property owner the “right to 
be free of pollution.”  Either way, the parties will agree to the same (efficient) amount of 
pollution.  Coase also noted that the assignment of legal entitlements can have 
distributional consequences, despite the absence of transaction costs.  Thus, although it 
makes no difference in terms of efficiency whether the polluter or the pollutee has the 
relevant legal entitlement, again assuming zero transaction costs, the assignment of the 
legal entitlement can make a big difference to the parties involved and can dramatically 
affect their relative wealth.    We refer to this observation as the Coasean “distributional 
variance proposition.” 
Although Coase’s original paper focused on a hypothetical world in which transaction 
costs were totally absent, Coase was well aware that in all real-world settings transaction 
costs are present and, in many settings, are high.4  For this reason, the Coase Theorem is 
perhaps most influential for what it says about a world with transaction costs: that in such 
a world the assignment of legal entitlements (or the choice of legal rules) can affect 
overall efficiency.5  Indeed, this re-statement of Coase’s basic point can reasonably be 
understood as the conceptual foundation of the entire law-and-economics movement, 
which has risen to prominence within the American legal academy over the past several 
decades.  Most law-and-economics scholarship in the fields of torts, property, and 
contract law can be seen as attempting to assess whether existing legal rules are efficient 
or to ascertain the most efficient legal rule for a given situation, given the existence of 
transaction costs.   
                                                 
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
2 Steve G. Medema & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Coase Theorem, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, VOLUME I. THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 839 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert, and Gerrit De Geest, eds.) (2000), available on line at 
http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/0730book.pdf. 
3 Id. at 840. 
4 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988) (“The world of zero transaction 
costs has often been described as a Coasian world.  Nothing could be further from the truth.”). 
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One famous example of this sort of scholarship would be the work of Guido Calabresi 
in tort law.  In his seminal book, “The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis,” Calabresi concluded that, assuming transaction costs prevent a Coasean result, 
the optimal tort liability regime is one that minimizes the sum of the cost of accidents and 
the cost of avoiding accidents, including the administrative costs of the tort system.  
Calabresi concluded that such a regime will sometimes call for assigning tort liability to 
the “cheapest cost avoider” – that is, to the party able to minimize negative externalities 
(or third-party harms) most efficiently.  We refer to this party as the cheapest-cost or 
least-cost harm avoider.6 
Unbeknownst to most lawyers, but well known to economists, there is a theorem 
within the economic analysis of taxation that is, on its face, strikingly similar to the 
Coase Theorem.  This notion, dubbed the “theorem of the invariance of tax incidence” by 
economist Hugh Dalton in the 1950s, has been present in the public finance literature for 
decades.7  Although this theorem is rarely stated formally, the informal version goes 
something like this:  The incidence of a tax imposed on the sale or purchase of a good or 
service will be independent of the assignment of the legal obligation to remit the tax to 
the government.8  That is to say, it does not matter if the obligation to remit the tax is 
imposed on the seller or the purchaser of a good or service: the result will be the same.  
By “obligation to remit” we mean the obligation imposed by law on a private party to 
transfer funds in satisfaction of a particular legal liability.  (As we discuss more fully 
below, a precise statement of the Coase Theorem also requires the use of the concept of 
remittance.)  As with the Coase Theorem, the tax remittance invariance conclusion 
depends on a number of assumptions, although in the tax remittance case the assumptions 
have largely been implicit.  Because this version of the tax remittance invariance idea is 
about incidence, we will refer to it as the “Tax Remittance Invariance Proposition—
Incidence,” or TRIPI for short.   
The reasoning underlying the tax remittance idea also implies a parallel efficiency (or 
inefficiency) proposition.  That is, under standard competitive-market assumptions, the 
allocation of resources — and therefore the welfare costs of a tax — do not depend on 
who (as between the two parties to the transaction) is required to remit the tax to the 
government.  We call this the “Tax Remittance Invariance Proposition—Efficiency” (or 
TRIPE).   
In contrast to the vast literature expanding on the Coase Theorem – exploring its 
implications for various areas of private law (including torts) and investigating its 
underlying assumptions9 – little scholarly attention has been directed at understanding the 
key assumptions underlying the tax law invariance ideas.10  What is even more puzzling 
is that, despite the general acceptance of the tax remittance invariance propositions within 
                                                 
6 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).  
7 HUGH DALTON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1954). 
8 See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE (8th ed. 2008); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (3rd ed. 2000). 
9 Some of this literature is cited and summarized in Medem & Zerbe, supra note __ and in David De Meza, 
Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 270 (Peter Newman, ed.) 
(1998). 
10 One exception is Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The 
Economics of Tax Remittance.  61 NAT. TAX J. 251 (2008). 
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the public finance literature and the canonical status of the Coase theorem within the law-
and-economics literature, the obvious parallels, and somewhat less obvious differences, 
between Coase and the TRIPs have gone completely unanalyzed.   In this article, using 
examples from tort law as our primary analytical lens, we aim to fill these gaps in the 
literature.  In addition, we explore the generality or lack of generality of the tax 
remittance propositions by incorporating some of the insights of the Coase literature; and 
we examine the extent to which the tax remittance invariance propositions depend on 
their underlying assumptions, just as is the case with the Coase Theorem. 
One contribution of the Article to the Coase literature is to emphasize the importance 
of the distinction between two general types of situations:  those in which the parties in 
question – the ones whose activities are jointly causing an external harm or cost – are in a 
contractual or market (i.e., buyer/seller) relationship with each other and those in which 
they are not.  Furthermore, we show how the same distinction matters in the tax 
context.11  Thus, we explain how Coase’s distributional variance proposition applies on
in non-market settings, such as those involving conflicting land uses, as in the classic 
case of the farmer and the rancher.  In market settings, however, a sort of distributional 
invariance proposition will hold.  That is, regardless of which party is assigned the 
obligation to remit a given cost, the actual burden of that cost remittance obligation will 
depend on the relative elasticities of supply and demand for whatever good or service is 
the subject of the contractual relationship and the origin of the incurred cost.
ly 
e 
IPI above.  
                                                
12  In th
economics literature, of course, a version of the same point exists with respect to taxes 
(rather than harms) that are triggered by transactions; we gave it the name TR
The primary normative conclusion that emerges from this Article’s blending of torts 
and tax can be summarized as follows:  Parallel with Calabresi’s canonical formulation 
for the design of an optimal tort system, an optimal tax remittance regime requires that 
tax liabilities be assigned so as to minimize the overall social costs of compliance and 
administration, for a given level of achievement of the tax law’s desired distributional 
and revenue goals.  By compliance costs we mean the private costs to the parties (and 
therefore the social costs) of complying with the law.  By administrative costs, we mean 
the non-private social costs of enforcing compliance with the law.13  As is true with the 
administration of the civil liability system, the overall compliance and administrative 
costs of a tax system will sometimes differ dramatically depending on which party or 
class of parties (e.g., employers versus employees; consumers versus retail businesses) is 
saddled with the legal obligation to transfer the tax monies to the government.  Thus, 
optimal tax policy may in some situations call for assigning the tax remittance obligation 
 
11 With any market purchase of goods or services, even in a spot market, there will be some sort of explicit 
or implicit contract.  For that reason, we use the terms “market setting” and “contractual setting” 
synonymously.   
12 Richard Craswell ably demonstrates this point.  Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: 
Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1990).  Craswell’s article 
focuses on the contractual relationship between injurers and victims (such as product manufacturers and 
product consumers).  Our analysis focuses on situations in which two or more parties are collaborating in 
some activity that causes harm to a third party. 
13 We do not regard fines that are imposed as part of an enforcement regime as social costs, since fines are 
transfers of resources from one party to another.  However, the costs of administering and enforcing a 
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to the lowest-compliance-cost tax remitter – that is, the party with the lowest private 
compliance costs per dollar of tax remitted.  By contrast, it will sometimes be optimal to 
assign the remittance obligation to the party for whom the administrative (or 
enforcement) cost per dollar of tax revenue raised is lowest – or the lowest-
administrative-cost tax remitter.  For one example, if the remittance obligation is assigned 
to a party who is innately dishonest (someone who has not internalized the norm of tax 
law compliance) and who is engaged in a business that provides numerous low-cost 
opportunities for evasion, then either much of the tax will go uncollected (if we imagine a 
fixed IRS enforcement budget) or the cost of collection for the government will be much 
higher than if the remittance obligation were imposed on an inherently compliant (well 
socialized) party.14   
For the same reasons, the government will want to avoid placing the remittance 
obligation on the lowest-cost liability avoider; that is, the party who can mostly cheaply 
(in terms of private costs) avoid enforcement of the tort or tax law.  This would be the 
party for whom it is most administratively expensive for the government to make comply.  
What this implies is that, contrary to the naïve interpretation of the Coase Theorem and of 
TRIPs (but consistent with the Calabresian notion of the least-cost harm avoider), overall 
social welfare will be maximized only if the tax planning authority takes into account the 
relative compliance and administrative costs in assigning tax remittance obligations. 
One can distinguish between the obligation to remit a tax – to transfer resources to the 
government – and the obligation to report or inform the government about a tax liability.  
An example of the former is the obligation placed on employers to remit withholding 
taxes on employees’ wages.  An example of the latter is the employers’ obligation to 
submit W-2 forms to the IRS detailing the amount of wages paid to employees.  As we 
discuss further below, both of these obligations are important to tax enforcement, 
although we emphasize remittance.  Tax-remittance and information-reporting 
obligations usually go together (that is, a party with a remittance obligation usually also 
has an information reporting obligation—at least insofar as the act of remitting itself is a 
type of information reporting); however, the link between remittance and reporting is not 
logically necessary and could in theory be split up.  We discuss this possibility below.     
The Article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 offers a primer on the Coase Theorem, 
beginning with the classic case of neighbor externalizing on neighbor (farmer and 
rancher), and it explains the basic invariance propositions.  Section 3 shifts the focus to 
Coasean situations involving buyers and sellers in a market or contractual relationship, 
buyers and sellers whose market interactions cause harm to third parties.  Using supply-
and-demand diagrams, we illustrate (in a new way) some of the most basic findings of the 
economic analysis of law, including both the Coasean invariance and efficiency 
propositions and the Calabresian least-cost avoider idea.  Also in section 3 we make an 
efficiency argument for vicarious employer liability for employee torts and suggest this 
doctrine could in theory be expanded in certain situations to (a) independent contractors 
and (b) torts beyond the scope of employment.  Our analysis builds on the standard law-
                                                 
14 Of course, an individual’s willingness to comply voluntarily with the law, in the absence of a threat of 
external punishment, is not necessarily an inherent trait.  Society actually spends resources to inculcate 
such values.   For purposes of this article, however, we ignore the social costs of instilling in individuals the 
willingness to comply in the absence of a threat of external punishment. 
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and-economics analysis of vicarious liability, but emphasizes the need to minimize not 
only the costs of third-party harms but also administrative costs.   
Section 4 then moves from torts to tax – specifically, to taxes triggered by 
buyer/seller market relationships, such as employer/employee interactions.  The section 
uses supply-and-demand curves to illustrate the tax remittance invariance propositions in 
their classic form, as found in every public finance textbook, under the assumptions of 
zero (or symmetrical) compliance and administrative costs.  Section 4 then uses those 
same diagrams to explain how the invariance propositions no longer apply under the 
more realistic assumptions of asymmetric compliance and administrative costs.  More 
specifically, we show that the optimal assignment of tax remittance responsibility (as 
between buyer and seller) turns on which assignment minimizes the sum of compliance 
and administrative costs incurred to raise a given amount of revenue.  We argue that, in 
general, the least-overall-cost tax remitter, for taxes triggered by buyer/seller 
transactions, will be the larger, wealthier party – both because there are economies of 
scale to enforcement against large tax remitter and because wealthier taxpayers are less 
likely to be judgment proof. 
Section 5 discusses some of the real-world implications of our analysis, both 
normative and positive.  As a positive matter, our analysis provides an explanation for 
why the U.S. income tax system and most other income tax systems require employers to 
remit the bulk of their employee’s personal income tax liabilities.  Likewise, our analysis 
explains why the remittance obligation for sales taxes is usually imposed on sellers rather 
than buyers.  In addition, our framework explains why tax remittance obligations are 
generally made mandatory (or non-transferable) in the sense that Coasean bargaining 
over the tax remittance obligation is not permitted.  Finally, our analysis also helps to 
explain why the remittance obligation for the gift tax is imposed, initially, on the donor 
and, secondarily, on the donee.     
In addition to providing a way of understanding current tax law, our framework also 
suggests some possible reforms of existing tax enforcement policy.  For example, we 
argue for, under certain conditions, expanding employers’ tax remittance obligation to 
include payments to independent contractors, as employers in those situations are more 
likely to be the least-cost remitters – both in terms of compliance and administrative 
costs.  In other words, the existing distinction between employees and independent 
contractors, which may be optimal for tort law purposes, may not be optimally drawn for 
tax remittance purposes.  In addition, we explore the possibility of expanding the role of 
employers as remitters for their employees’ (and contractors’) tax liabilities even for 
income earned outside of the employment (or contractual) relationship.  We also point 
out that current withholding rules with respect to tip income of employees in service 
businesses (especially in restaurants) could be strengthened to exploit the cheapest-cost 
remitter idea.  With the tipping example, we also explore further the distinction between 
remittance and reporting and why the latter is not always a substitute for the former.   
Also in this section we suggest generally that remittance responsibility for business or 
corporate remitters should be tied to the size of the remitter; that is, the larger the firm (in 
terms of gross revenue, profits, or assets), the stronger the argument for expanding their 
compulsory remittance responsibility.  Moving beyond income taxes, our analysis 
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liability for property taxes (where the remittance obligation is imposed, in effect, on a 
piece of property rather than on a person) rather than standard in personam liability and 
why non-standard withholding regimes, including so-called “reverse withholding,” under 
which remittance responsibility is triggered by any commercial interaction with difficult-
to-tax parties, can achieve the desired level and distribution of tax collection at the lowest 
possible overall cost.   
We conclude by considering some qualifications to our analysis, including 
behavioral, political economy, and transition issues.  One qualification deserves a 
mention at the outset:  Our analysis ignores international, or more generally cross-
jurisdictional, issues.  That is, we assume that all of the relevant parties, all of the parties 
to whom the tax (or, for that matter, tort) remittance obligation might conceivably be 
assigned are within the relevant jurisdiction.  As our analysis shows the importance of the 
assignment of remittance responsibility, the existence of jurisdictional borders beyond 
which remittance responsibility may not be assigned is a serious complication.  
Moreover, the possibility of parties avoiding remittance responsibility by locating outside 
of the relevant jurisdiction obviously presents a serious problem for any regime of tax (or 
tort) enforcement.     
 
2. A Primer on Coase: Farmers, Ranchers, and Other “Neighbors” 
The Coase Theorem makes what now seems like an obvious point:  in a world with 
zero transaction costs, the initial assignment of a legal right or entitlement will not affect 
the allocation of resources, because the affected parties will always bargain to the 
efficient result, so long as everyone involved is rational (in the way that economists 
normally mean that term) and the entitlement in question is alienable (that is, the 
entitlement can be transferred).  Before exploring this conclusion, it will be useful to 
clarify what is meant by the term “legal entitlement” in this context.  In general, the 
Coasean logic has been applied to situations in which the action of one party causes some 
harm or imposes some cost on another party – the classic negative externality.15  The 
entitlement at issue, then, is the right to avoid negative consequences of the action:  either 
the right of “the injurer” to impose the cost on others or the right of “the victim” to 
prevent the harm or to insist on compensation for it.16   
The quintessential example of the Coase Theorem in action, from Coase himself, 
involves conflicting land uses, specifically neighboring landowners, a cattle rancher and a 
corn farmer.  The Coasean question, then, is who, as between the farmer and the rancher, 
should be legally responsible for the crop damage caused when the rancher’s cows 
                                                 
15 Of course, a symmetrical Coasean story can be told for positive externalities, where the externality is not 
a cost or harm but some benefit that is bestowed unintentionally by one party on another.  In those settings 
too, if transaction costs are zero, people are rational, and entitlements are freely tradable, parties will 
bargain to the efficient result.  Following the literature, we tend to focus on negative externalities.  
16 If the victim (the party who suffers the harm in the first instance) is given the entitlement to be free from 
harm, a second issue is what sort of rule would be used to protect that entitlement:  a property rule or a 
liability rule.  Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L.Rev, 1089 (1972).  If the entitlement is protected by a property rule, 
then the victim has the legal right to get an injunction to stop the harm-causing activity in question. If it is 
protected by a liability rule, then the victim’s legal remedies are limited to an ex post suit for damages.   
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happen to trespass on the farmer’s property and damage his corn.  Or, put in terms of this 
Article’s framework, who should be assigned the remittance obligation with respect to 
the crop damage caused by any cattle that stray onto the farmer’s property.  If the rancher 
is legally required to remit to the farmer an amount of money equal to his corn damage, 
we would say that the entitlement rests with the farmer and the remittance obligation with 
the rancher.   And if the rancher is not required to remit the money for any harm caused 
by his straying cows on the farmer’s property, we would say that the remittance 
obligation rests with the farmer (and the legal entitlement with the rancher).17  
What Coase demonstrated was that, in a frictionless world, it does not matter (from an 
efficiency perspective) how the legal entitlement (or remittance obligation) is assigned.  
The efficient, joint-wealth-maximizing outcomes – will eventually be reached through a 
process that is now sometimes referred to as “Coasean bargaining.”  If it is efficient to 
produce corn but not cattle on two adjoining pieces of property, or the reverse, the 
neighboring landowners will bargain to that result.18  And they will do so whether the 
entitlement is placed with the farmer or with the rancher.   If efficiency calls for both corn 
and cattle to be produced but for a fence to be erected between the two properties, then 
that is what will happen, and it will happen in the most efficient way possible, with the 
parties agreeing that the best fence builder should do the job.19  This is Calabresi’s 
                                                 
17 Of course, however the remittance obligation for the costs of damaged corn is allocated between farmer 
and rancher, the actual economic burden of this obligation may then be “passed on” to the farmer’s 
employees or customers, or to those of the ranchers, depending on, among other things, the relative 
elasticities of relevant supply and demand in those markets.  This is unlikely to occur, though, if the legal 
assignment and subsequent bargains apply to just one rancher and farmer, as the prices of the commodities 
will be set in a much larger market.  We have more to say about this sort of cost pass-through below. 
18 For example, imagine that the lost profit to the farmer of not being able to grow and sell his corn (should 
the rancher next door be given the entitlement to ignore the damage caused by his cattle) would be $100; 
and the cost to the rancher of not being able to have cattle would be $150 in lost profit.  In that simple case, 
if the social planner were to give the entitlement initially to the rancher, the rancher would indeed decide to 
have cattle, letting them roam the countryside, and would make $150 of profit; and the farmer, anticipating 
the rancher’s behavior (and the potential damage to his crops), would opt not to plant corn and would 
thereby lose $100 of potential corn profit.  So we would have cattle but not corn from these two 
landowners, and this, on the facts, would be the efficient result as it maximizes the joint benefit to the 
parties of their uses of their land net of costs. 
19 Imagine that in the previous example the farmer could for $75 build a fence that would make it possible 
for both the farmer to have his corn and the rancher to have her cattle but, for whatever reason, the 
rancher’s cost of building a fence was much higher—say, $200.  Obviously, the parties under the Coasean 
assumptions would agree to have the farmer build the fence, and this would happen regardless of the initial 
assignment of entitlements.  (In our example, so long as a fully effective fence could be built for less than 
$250 (the total combined profit of farming and ranching), then the fence would be built.)  This conclusion 
follows from the fact that having the farmer build the fence would produce the highest joint value from the 
two properties.  ($150 cattle profit + $100 corn profit - $75 fence cost = $175.)  In Calabresi’s famous 
phrasing, the farmer in this situation would be the “cheapest cost avoider” and would therefore, under 
Coasean assumptions, end up with the responsibility for building the fence.  In this Article we use the term 
cheapest-cost or least-cost harm avoider in cases where the private costs are also social costs; we use the 
term cheapest- or least-cost liability avoiders in cases where the private costs are not social costs or, in 
particular, when the private benefits of tax avoidance do not correspond to social benefits,  This is just 
another way of illustrating that, in the absence of transaction costs, the parties will internalize all external 
costs and will therefore take all cost-justified measures to reduce those costs.  And the same bargaining that 
will assign the entitlement to the party with the highest-valued use will also ensure that the party who is 
best able to reduce the size of the negative externality (the cheapest-cost harm avoider) will do so.  It is all 
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cheapest-cost harm avoider idea, and the law can achieve this result in a Coasean world 
simply by setting the initial legal entitlements one way or the other and letting the parties 
negotiate.  The same analysis can be applied to any negative externality: pollution, 
automobile accidents, whatever.20  As long as transaction costs are assumed to be zero 
(and everyone is rational), all affected parties will take part in the Coasean bargaining 
process; all externalities will be internalized.  There will be the “right,” or social-welfare-
maximizing amount of the activity and all cost-justified investments in cost reduction will 
be made.  In the torts literature, these latter two effects are known as activity-level effects 
and the care-level effects.21 
Numerous criticisms of the Coase Theorem have been advanced over the years, both 
of the efficiency proposition and the invariance proposition.  Some scholars, for example, 
have pointed out that invariance will not hold when there is a divergence between the 
amount a party is “willing to pay” (WTP) to acquire an entitlement and the amount he is 
“willing to accept” (WTA) to give up the same entitlement, due perhaps to the kind of 
endowment effect discussed in prospect theory.22  This kind of effect has been confirmed 
in empirical studies, and it can lead to invariance of outcomes – though not to 
inefficiency, assuming a world of zero transaction costs.  In addition to the WTP/WTA 
critique, there are game-theoretic objections to both the invariance and the efficiency 
propositions.  Many of the paradigmatic examples of Coasean bargaining involve 
situations that could give rise to strategic behavior by the parties, which may lead to a 
result that is not joint-wealth-maximizing.  For example, if the interactions between the 
parties are modeled as a non-cooperative game with asymmetric information, strategic 
behavior of various sorts may prevent an efficient outcome.23  This is sometimes referred 
to as the bargaining problem or the problem of bilateral monopoly.  Some commentators 
argue that the bilateral monopoly critique fails to take seriously the zero-transaction cost 
assumption, which includes an assumption of perfect information on both sides 
(including information about the payoffs to each side of all possible outcomes).  Under 
those assumptions, bargaining failures would not occur.  But even so, it can hardly be 
denied that in many real-world settings between two (or relatively few) bargaining parties 
some value-maximizing outcomes are not achieved, either because of transaction costs 
(conventionally understood) or by strategic behavior; and the relevance of the Coase 
Theorem to those situations can reasonably be questioned. 
Notably the traditional Coasean bargaining situation involves conflicting land uses in 
which there is no prior contractual relationship between the two parties.  The injurer and 
the victim are not in a contractual seller-buyer relationship with each other.  Rather, they 
are just neighbors; and their separate activities happen to conflict in the sense that, 
because the activities take place in close proximity to each other, a particular external 
cost arises, the remittance obligation for which needs to be assigned, explicitly or 
implicitly.  The same would be true for the property owner whose manufacturing 
business pollutes the neighbors’ air or water; in that case, the pollution would not arise 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note __. 
21 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
22 See., e.g., Herbert J. Hovenkamp,  Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
783 (1990). 
23 Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. L. & ECON. 427 (1972). 
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out of the transaction between the manufacturer and its consumer/neighbors, but is 
unrelated to any such transaction.   
There are two interesting implications from this non-contractual setting.  First, unlike 
a competitive market where the market price is set by the intersection of supply and 
demand, in a classic Coasean conflicting-land-use situation the distribution of the gains 
from trade is determined by bargaining between the parties.  Thus, assuming some sort of 
bargain is reached (and the bilateral monopoly problem overcome), the distribution of the 
gains from trade will depend on the parties’ relative bargaining positions.24  The other 
interesting implication of the standard Coasean non-contractual setting is that, precisely 
because these are bargaining situations, the assignment of the legal entitlement to one 
side or the other will have distributional consequences.  We have called this insight the 
Coasean distributional variance proposition.25  The point is that having the legal right to 
impose costs onto your neighbor, or the legal right to prevent your neighbor from 
imposing costs onto you, is itself a distinct and valuable asset.  Thus, if the rule has 
always has been that ranchers are entitled to let their cattle roam the countryside, 
switching the entitlement to farmers would cause a drop in the value of the affected 
ranches relative to the affected farms.  In effect, one of the costs of farming would have 
disappeared and reappeared as a cost of ranching.  Such a change in legal rules would be 
akin to a lump-sum transfer from farmers to ranchers.  The same analysis could be 
applied to the example of the polluting manufacturer.  If manufacturers suddenly become 
responsible for the pollution they impose on their neighbors, the manufacturing business 
would then be less profitable and precisely by the amount of the expected value of the 
cost of pollution or pollution abatement.  Likewise, the value of owning a car is 
somewhat less if the owner has to pay for injuries to pedestrians than if he does not. 
These distributional consequences are diminished to the extent the affected assets of 
the parties are costlessly convertible to another equally profitable use or, conversely, that 
free entry into an industry dissipates the long-run gain in profits that would otherwise 
accrue to those already in business.26  Moreover, to the extent the harm in question can 
be prevented with a trivial investment on the part of either party, the distribution
consequences of the assignment will be similarly trivial.  For example, in the extreme 
case, if ranch land could just as easily be used for farming (say the land is equally 
profitable put to either use such that the choice to farm or ranch was virtually a matter of 
indifference to the landowner), and assuming zero costs of converting from one to the 
other, there would be no distributional effect of altering the entitlement at issue.  When 
the rule changes and ranchers were required to corral their cattle or pay for the damage 
al 
                                                 
24 Continuing with our example of the farmer and rancher who are neighbors (and whose land uses are 
incompatible), imagine what would happen in a Coasean world if the “entitlement” not to remit is given to 
the farmer.  Given that the rancher can make $150 ranching, and the farmer only $100 farming, the rancher 
will presumably pay the farmer to purchase his entitlement – that is, pay him to remit.  Thus, the efficient 
outcome would be achieved.  However, the precise amount the rancher would end up paying the farmer is 
impossible to determine ex ante.  It would fall somewhere between $100 and $150, with the exact amount 
depending on the relative bargaining power of the two parties.  
25 As we discuss below, the Coasean distributional variance proposition does not apply in competitive 
market settings where the harm (or the tax) in question arises out of a contractual market transaction.   
26 This argument would not apply if the change in entitlement applied to just one adjacent farmer and 
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caused, the rancher could simply switch to farming.  Of course, if ranchland is not 
costlessly convertible to farmland or if the farmer has made ranching-specific 
investments in livestock or equipment, then a change in the rule will affect the value of 
the rancher’s assets.  The same would be true on the farmer side of things, as the value of 
farming-specific investments would presumably rise.  We could tell the same story in the 
other direction, with farmers losing value and ranchers gaining; or we could substitute 
any other example of a negative externality for that the rancher/farmer scenario.  Hence, 
if a polluter could cheaply make some change in their operations that would eliminate the 
resulting pollutants, then the polluter’s entitlement to impose costs on its neighbor would 
not be worth very much.  And so on.  Of course, notwithstanding this caveat, there will 
be substantial activity-specific investments on one side or the other in many situations 
such that distributional variance in these types of situations is a nontrivial possibility. 
 
3. The Market Setting:  Sellers, Buyers, and Injured Third Parties 
 
a. Efficiency and Distributive Invariance: Assuming Zero (or Homogeneous) 
Compliance and Administrative Costs 
To move the analysis one step closer to our analogy between torts and tax, let us shift 
from the non-market “neighbor” setting to the long-run equilibrium of a market setting 
involving numerous buyers and sellers transacting over a homogeneous product in which 
no buyer or seller has market power.27  Thus, imagine that there are two classes of parties 
who are buyers and sellers with respect to each other; and suppose further that the 
production or consumption of the good or service sometimes harm third parties.  For 
example, the sellers could be makers of component parts that are sold to buyers who use 
those parts to manufacture a final product, which is then sold to retail customers -- some 
of whom end up being injured by the product.  Alternatively, the sellers could be 
manufacturers of products that are sold to consumers who sometimes use the products in 
ways that injure third parties.  For the purpose of illustration, we will for now presume 
that the market in question is a labor market and that the buyers are employers and the 
sellers are workers.  The problem, then, is that these labor market transactions not only 
produce value for the parties involved (in terms of wages paid for services received and 
employer business profits), they also sometimes cause external harms to third parties.28  
Suppose for now that these harms arise within the workers’ “scope of employment,” in 
the sense that the harm can reasonably be said to be in connection with the job that the 
worker is doing for the employer.  Imagine also that transactions costs between 
employers and workers are relatively low; that is, because we have a competitive labor 
market here, we assume that employers and workers reach joint-wealth-maximizing 
employment contracts.  We also assume, however, that the third-party victims are not part 
of this competitive labor market and that transaction costs prevent them from engaging in 
                                                 
27 Although these competitive market assumptions are useful for purposes of illustration, as they allow us to 
construct simple supply and demand curves to demonstrate our basic points of efficiency and distributional 
invariance, these assumptions are not necessary to produce the invariance results.        
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Coasean bargaining with either the employers or workers whose interaction generates the 
harm.  The third parties can do nothing to reduce this expected harm.  Either employers 
or the worker can take steps to reduce or eliminate the expected harm that their joint 
actions impose on third parties, but that neither is a “cheaper-cost harm avoider” than the 
other; that is, the cost to either of them per amount of reduction in expected harm is the 
same.   In addition, we ignore the consequences of the harm to the third parties, as we are 
focusing only on the deterrence or cost internalization function of liability law.29  Finally, 
assume that the administrative costs associated with employer or worker liability are 
equal.  (We have more to say on this assumption below.)   
Now we have a classic negative externality, and the relevant policy question is to 
whom we should assign the remittance responsibility for this third-party harm:  the 
workers (the sellers of labor) or the employers (the buyers of labor).30  To answer these 
questions, we depict our hypothesized labor market in a series of standard supply-and-
demand diagrams.  We start with the long-run equilibrium condition prior to the 
discovery that the buyer/seller transactions are causing harm to third parties.  This market 
is described in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
29 This approach can be justified if we imagine that all third-party victims are insured directly for these 
harms through first-party insurance policies and can recover directly from their insurers for the harm.  In 
that case, the tort actions that shift these costs either to buyers or sellers of the product or service that 
caused the third-party harm would be brought in the form of subrogation suits by the first-party insurance 
companies. 
30 Notice that we do not consider imposing the cost on the third-party victim.  This is because we have 
assumed that either employers or employees could efficiently reduce or eliminate the expected harm, but 
that the third parties could do nothing to affect the expected harm.  Also, an implicit assumption here is that 
the only available regulatory response is ex post liability for harm.  In fact, as we discuss below, ex ante 
regulation is also an option; however, it is likely to be very costly, a fact that will obviously have 
implications for the choice of the optimal legal response to the externality.  We return to this assumption 
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The aggregate demand curve in Figure 1, labeled D, shows for each price (or wage) the 
total quantity of units of labor that would be demanded by employers. The aggregate 
supply curve, labeled S, shows the aggregate quantity of units of labor supplied by 
employees at any given price.  The equilibrium price is p0, because only at that price will 
supply equal demand, and therefore will there be no upward or downward pressure on the 
wage.  At the equilibrium, x0 units of labor will be provided by workers.  The areas 
denoted by triangles CS and PS represent employer surplus and employee surplus, 
respectively, which is the total dollar value attributable to the ability to provide labor at 
the equilibrium wage and quantity. 
Now suppose that it is discovered that the particular activity that the employees are 
engaged in on behalf of the employer will on occasion cause harm to third parties.  The 
question then is whether that tort liability (the legal obligation to remit the tort damages 
to the injured plaintiffs) should be assigned in general to employers or to the employees – 
and whether it matters.  Put in classic Coasean terms:  what difference does the 
assignment of this entitlement/obligation make if we assume zero transaction costs (as 
between employer and employee), full rationality, and free transferability of legal 
entitlements?   The answer is none, not even a distributional difference.  This is because, 
given the Coasean assumptions, market forces will in the long run push employers and 
workers to reach the efficient result.  What’s more, because of the price nexus here 
between employers and workers, the way in which this new external cost will be borne by 
the parties will depend entirely on the elasticities of supply and demand for the workers’ 
labor and not at all on the initial assignment of the legal entitlement, i.e., the remittance 
obligation.   
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To illustrate this basic point, we add to our model a new cost, which we assume, for 
now, is equal to c per unit of labor sold no matter whether employers or workers are held 
liable.  This assumption is built on two sub-assumptions.  One, it entails an assumption 
that the cost rises proportionally with the aggregate amount of the good or service sold 
and consumed (here, labor).  This assumption implies that the cost can be represented by 
either a parallel shift in the supply or demand curve in the figures below.  Two, it entails 
the assumption discussed above that neither employers nor workers are cheaper-cost 
harm avoiders than the other.  That the per-unit cost of liability is c, whether employers 
or workers are assigned remittance responsibility, also implies that employers and 
workers have the same risk preferences or the same costs of purchasing liability 
insurance.  With these new assumptions, Figure 2 depicts the situation in which the 
obligation to remit the cost of third-party injuries is assigned to workers, the suppliers of 
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Because the remittance obligation for this per-unit cost is legally assigned to workers, 
it means that, at whatever price they would have required to provide any given output of 
labor previously, they now require a price that is c higher.  This fact is represented by a 
parallel upward shift in the labor supply curve by a distance of c.  The new supply curve 
is labeled S', which means that, at any quantity of labor provided, the height of S' 
represents the wage received by workers that would have to be necessary to induce this 
output.  The height of S at any given output represents what the worker would receive for 
labor, net of the new cost c, if that much labor were sold.  After the introduction of this 
new cost, the new long-run equilibrium wage paid by employers is p1 and the equilibrium 
output is x1; the wage net of the cost is q1, which is equal to p1-c. 
Because there is a new cost that has been introduced into this market, it should not be 
a surprise that there is a loss of social welfare, which is represented by the decline in 
overall worker and employer surplus, shown as the area EBCF in Figure 2.  The question 
now is, given the particular assignment of remittance obligations (here to workers), who 
actually bears the burden of the cost, where by “bearing the burden” we again mean 
whose welfare or utility is reduced as a result of this new cost.31  The naïve answer would 
be that the workers bear the cost, because they are legally responsible for remittance.  
                                                 
31 The loss of total surplus in Figure 2 is the area EBCF; this is the sum of EGCF, the cost c times actual 
output x1, or cx1, and the area EBG, which represents the social cost of forgoing the output x0-x1. As we 
will see later, the triangle is analogous to the classic deadweight loss, or Harberger, triangle that is well-
known in tax analysis. 
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However, because of the change in the prices of labor caused by the increased cost that 
shifts the supply curve, and because of the divergence between the wage rate paid by the 
employer (p1) and the wage net of cost received by the worker (q1) in the new 
equilibrium, the allocation of the economic burden of the new cost is not determined by 
the assignment of the remittance obligation.  Rather, it is determined by the elasticities of 
supply and demand for the workers’ labor. 
To see this point, refer again to Figure 2.  How the discovery of the new labor cost 
will affect the welfare of workers and employers is approximated by the change in 
employer and worker surplus, respectively.32  The decline in employer surplus is the area 
IEBJ, which represents the loss of utility to employers due to the increased price for labor 
and the reduced consumption of labor.  IEBJ is equal to the rectangle IELJ (which is (p1-
p0)x1 – or the portion of the aggregate cost of third-party risk borne by employers at the 
new equilibrium quantity) plus the triangle EBL (which is the loss of value to employers 
resulting from the reduction in the quantity purchased).  By similar logic, the loss in 
worker surplus is JBGK, which is due to the reduction in the net-of-cost price of the 
amount of labor produced, JLGK,33 and the loss of value to workers from the reduction in 
quantity of labor supplied, the triangle LBG.  The divergence between the equilibrium 
wage paid by the employer (p1) and the equilibrium net-of-harm-related-cost price 
received by the worker (q1) is key here.  The extent to which these two prices will diverge 
from the original equilibrium price (p0) that prevailed prior to the discovery of the new 
cost, will determine how this new cost affects the welfare of employers and workers.  
This “split” of the new cost in turn depends on the relative elasticity of supply and 
demand: the higher is the relative elasticity of demand for labor (i.e., the flatter the 
curve), the lower will be (p1-p0) relative to (p0-q1), and the lower will be the relative 
burden borne by the employers.  The same point could be made about supply:  the more 
elastic the supply of labor, the lower will be (p0-q1) relative to (p1-p0).  In sum, as 
between workers and employers, the (relatively) more elastic party – the one with better 
alternatives to this particular employment relationship – will bear less of the economic 
burden of the new third-party liability.   
Now for the invariance point mentioned in the introduction:  The distribution of the 
economic burden imposed by these new costs of third-party liability between sellers and 
buyers (workers and employers here) will depend on the relative elasticities, and that 
distributional outcome will be invariant to the assignment of the initial legal obligation.  
This point is illustrated by changing the example to assign to employers rather than 
workers the legal obligation to remit the cost of the third-party liability.  Figure 3 shows 
the results.  The value of labor to employers, net of the new liability cost, is unchanged; 
therefore, the D curve still represents the willingness to pay net of this cost.  However, 
the price employers are willing to pay is less than before.  Thus, instead of a shift in 
supply, we have a downward shift in the demand curve, from D to D', by an amount 
equal to the new liability cost, c.  The new demand curve intersects the supply curve at 
point G, and q1 is the new equilibrium price paid to the workers.  The total cost to the 
employer is q1+c, which is equal to p1.   Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 2, we see that 
                                                 
32 Here employer and worker surplus are just specific cases of consumer and producer surplus. 
33 This is calculated simply by multiplying the change in the price received by producers (p0  -q1) by the 
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everything is the same, including the total wage paid by employers, the price received by 
workers, and the quantity of labor.  Both the employer surplus and the worker surplus are 
the same in both situations, as is the loss of surplus caused by the discovery of the new 
liability cost.  In Figure 3 the lost surplus is the area ABGH, which is exactly equal to 
area FEBC in Figure 2, and both are equal to cx1+EBG.  The incidence and efficiency 
consequences are identical. 
 
b.  Differential Prevention Costs: The Least-Cost Harm Avoider 
Note that the invariance result just described remains unchanged if we relax the 
assumption that neither party is a cheaper-cost harm avoider than the other, so long as we 
maintain the Coasean assumptions of zero transaction costs as between buyer and seller 
and the free transferability of interests.  Imagine, for example, that workers happen to be 
the cheaper-cost harm avoiders, such that the per-unit cost to them of being assigned 
legal responsibility for third-party harms is not c but the smaller c'; whereas the cost of 
third-party liability remains c for employers.34  Thus, were it not for the Coase Theorem, 
one might conclude, by a comparison of Figure 4 and Figure 3, that the overall loss of 
social welfare caused by third-party liability would be lower if the legal obligation were 
assigned to workers.  Not so, under Coase.  That is, even if the remittance obligation were 
imposed initially on employers, competition would induce workers to offer to assume 
liability for the third-party harm (and to purchase insurance for the risk at cost c'), which 
employers would accept, because the c' is by assumption lower than the cost, c, of the 
employers’ purchasing insurance against the risk on their own.   Thus, no matter how the 
initial legal obligation is assigned, with frictionless transferability the remittance 
obligation between employer and worker (between buyer and seller) would end up in the 
efficient place: on workers.  And we would end up with Figure 4. 35  Obviously, the same 
sort of analysis could be done if the employer were the least-cost harm avoider, in which 
case, regardless of the law’s assignment of tort liability, we would expect the parties to 
agree to employment contracts that placed tort liability on employers.   
                                                 
34 Thus, we are assuming for simplicity that either the employee can take steps to reduce the third-party 
accident risk or the employer can do so, but not both simultaneously.  Thus, the question is which of them 
should be given assigned the legal responsibility for the full harm.  In many situations, of course, it will be 
optimal for both the employer and the employee to make investments in “care” (expenditures to reduce the 
expected costs of third-party harm).  In such situations, there is no single “cheapest-cost harm avoider.”  
This complication will not matter in a contractual setting in which buyers and sellers, through their Coasean 
interactions with each other, can create incentives for both parties to take optimal care.  We use the 
cheapest-cost harm avoider example for ease of exposition.  We also assume that the only possible liability 
rule is strict liability for third-party harm, which will be imposed either on employers or employees.  The 
analysis could also be applied to fault-based liability rules.   
35 In Figure 4, the reduction in equilibrium output is smaller compared to Figure 2 or 3.  The increase in the 
wage paid is less, as is the decline in the wage received by the worker.  Finally, the social cost is lower, 
being equal to F'E'BC, or c'x1'+E'BG'.    
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This invariance conclusion, of course, does not imply that the assignment of the legal 
responsibility for third-party liability is irrelevant in a world with high transaction costs 
(as between employer and employee) or in a world in which legal entitlements are 
nontransferable.  For example, if we imagine that transaction costs are high, the efficient 
result would be to assign the responsibility for third-party liability to the least-cost harm 
avoider – whichever party faced cost c' rather than c – assuming the policy maker can 
determine with relative ease who that is.36  If that happens to be the workers, the most 
efficient assignment of legal responsibility would entail worker liability; if the employer, 
however, is the least-cost harm avoider, then the rule should be employer liability.  This 
is just standard Calabresi.  Likewise, even if transaction costs are low as between the 
market participants whose transactions produce the third-party harm, if we imagine that 
the legal entitlement in question will be made nontransferable, then the initial legal rule 
will matter.  Thus, for example, if workers are the least-cost avoiders of third-party harm 
(i.e., the cost would be c' for workers and c for employers) and we place the legal 
responsibility on employers, and (importantly) we make that legal assignment 
nontransferable, then the parties will be made worse off.  Indeed, even workers, the likely 
intended beneficiaries of such a rule, may be made worse off.37 
                                                 
36 More specifically, assuming the cost of identifying the cheapest-cost harm avoider is lower than the cost 
savings from moving from c to c'. 
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c.  Differential Administrative Costs: Insolvent Defendants, Least-Cost Liability 
Avoider 
In the last section we concluded that, in a situation in which a buyer-seller market 
transaction gives rise to a third-party harm, it would be optimal to assign the legal 
responsibility for the third-party harm to the least-cost harm avoider, as between the 
buyer and the seller, assuming (among other things) that the cost of identifying the latter 
is relatively low.38  In this section we address an important qualification to that 
conclusion. This qualification concerns the relative administrative costs of various 
alternative forms of regulation, as compared with the cost of the negative externality at 
issue.  For example, consider how the analysis changes if the least-cost harm avoider is 
judgment-proof; that is, the least-cost harm avoider does not have assets sufficient to 
cover the potential tort liability and will therefore, to the extent of the excess, ignore the 
threat of ex post liability.   
To see how this new assumption alters the analysis, let us also assume that workers 
are the least-cost harm avoiders.  But imagine that they are entirely judgment-proof.  This 
is an extreme example, but it is not utterly fanciful.  If the only assets the workers have 
are the equity in their primary residences and their retirement accounts—assets that are to 
some extent protected from tort creditors under state bankruptcy laws—they would 
indeed be largely judgment-proof.39  In that case, although the workers may be the least-
cost harm avoiders, they are also the least-cost liability avoiders.  Being the cheaper-cost 
liability avoiders, however, makes them decidedly not the overall least-cost alternative in 
terms of total social costs. To the contrary, in such a situation, the overall cost to the 
plaintiff (or to the legal system in general) of forcing the judgment-proof workers (and 
hence, through the price mechanism, employers) to internalize third-party harm would 
likely be extremely high.  The reason is that policymakers would have to resort to some 
other form of regulation, such as ex ante command-and-control supervision of the 
worker’s conduct, which is a type of regulation that in many situations is considered to be 
more expensive than simple ex post liability.40  In such a situation, the combined private 
compliance and public administrative costs associated with internalizing the third-party 
harm to the workers might well exceed the harm to the third-party.   In a sense, therefore, 
the so-called judgment proof problem can be seen as an administrative- or enforcement-
cost problem.  
                                                 
38 We are assuming that the third-party victim can do nothing to reduce the risk of harm and is fully insured 
against the consequences of the harm.  Given that information is costly, it may be impossible at reasonable 
cost for the social planner to determine who the cheapest-cost harm avoider is.  That is, both c and c' may 
not be cost-justifiably observable by the legal authority.  If that is the case, then the assignment of the 
obligation has to be made on some other basis. 
39 Many states limit the bankruptcy exemption available for retirement accounts and for primary residences. 
40 It is generally thought that, where the judgment proof problem is not present, ex post liability is a cheaper 
way of internalizing negative externalities, unless we believe that regulators are likely to know more about 
the relevant risks than the parties involved.  The informational burden on the regulator of the ex post 
liability system is considered relatively low compared with ex ante regulation.  Steven Shavell, Strict 
Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980); Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation vs. Post 
Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 193 (1977).  
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Because of this judgment-proof/administrative-cost problem, if imposing liability on 
the least-cost harm avoider (here, the worker) were the only ex post liability option, the 
efficient result might simply be no liability (i.e., to leave the costs on the victims).  
However, that is not the only ex post liability option.  It is also possible to impose the tort 
remittance responsibility on the next least-cost harm avoider – here the employers.  And 
if employers are not judgment-proof, it may generate lower overall social cost to impose 
liability on them rather than either (a) to impose liability on the workers, (b) to engage in 
ex ante regulation, or (c) to leave the costs on the plaintiffs.   
To see this point, go back to our example and assume that if workers are assigned the 
third-party liabilities (and they are not judgment-proof), the per-unit cost of that liability 
will be represented by c'; whereas, if the liability is assigned to employers the per-unit 
cost would be the larger cost, c.  Thus, workers in this case are the least-cost harm 
avoiders.  However, if employees are judgment-proof (requiring very expensive ex ante 
regulation to internalize the cost of third-party harms to this market), and if we include 
the administrative cost as part of the overall social cost, then the full cost of internalizing 
the third-party harm would not be c' but c'', which is, by assumption, even larger than c.  
In this situation, overall social welfare will be maximized by imposing liability on 
employers, who are, again, the next-least-cost harm avoiders.   
A version of the foregoing argument – the combination of the least-cost harm avoider 
story and the judgment-proof defendant story – is in fact the standard economic rationale 
for the tort concept of vicarious liability.41  “Vicarious liability” in the most general sense 
means to hold one party strictly liable for the tort committed by another.  The primary 
justification for this sort of secondary liability indeed builds on the idea that the former 
party may have some effective control over the harm caused by the latter and may be 
more amenable to regulation by ex post liability.  Thus, under the general legal doctrine 
of respondeat superior, whenever an agent, who is under the control of a principal, 
commits a tort against a third party, the principal may be held liable for the third-party 
harm, assuming the agent committed the tort while acting within the scope of the agency 
relationship.42  Applying this principle to the employment context, if an employee, while 
acting within the scope of her employment role, commits a tort and causes a harm to 
some third party, the injured party can sue either the employee directly for negligence or 
the employer vicariously, assuming the plaintiff can establish the elements of a tort claim 
(duty, breach, harm, and causation) against the employee.   In most cases, of course, the 
third party will sue both the employer and the employee, who can be held jointly and 
severally liable for the employee’s tort.43  Once a judgment is secured against both 
parties, the plaintiff can then seek to enforce it against either defendant, or partly against 
                                                 
41 Alan O. Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 
YALE L. J. 168 (1981); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and 
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious 
Liability, 93 YALE L. J. 1231 (1984); SHAVELL, supra note __ (1987); and Renier H. Kraakman, Vicarious 
and Corporate Civil Liability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME II. CIVIL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert, and Gerrit De Geest, eds.) (2000), available at 
http://users.ugent.be/~gdegeest/3400book.pdf. 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, 1958, §§2, 219, 220, 229.      
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one and partly against the other, whatever is most expedient.44  And if the employer is the 
only party who is not judgment-proof (either because the employer is the only party with 
sufficient assets to cover the liability or the only party with adequate liability insurance 
coverage), the judgment will typically be enforced against the employer.  If the employer 
is liable only vicariously (and not as a result of its own separate tort, such as negligence), 
then traditionally the employer would be allowed to seek “indemnity” from the 
employee.45  Interestingly, however, the right of indemnification from employees is not 
often invoked, perhaps because employers are, in effect, acting as the liability insurers of 
their employees.46   
The two primary efficiency justifications for vicarious liability of employers for the 
torts of their employees involve either a least-cost harm avoider type of argument (on the 
theory that employers will often be in a better position than the employees to take cost-
effective steps to minimize the relevant expected harms) or a judgment-proof or “deep-
pocket” type of story.47  And the two arguments work together in the way that is similar 
to the framework set out in this Article, although prior analyses of this question have not 
emphasized the importance of comparative administrative costs.  Thus, a case can be 
made that in many situations the employer will be, if not the least-cost harm avoider, a 
cheaper-cost harm avoider than the plaintiff.  Moreover, employees will often be partially 
or fully judgment-proof with respect to a potential tort judgment and thus partially if not 
totally non-responsive to the threat of legal liability, thus strengthening the case for 
employer vicarious liability.   
Similar arguments can be made for other types of vicarious liability.  For example, 
vicarious liability can also be imposed jointly and severally on all of the partners in a 
joint enterprise for the tort of any other partner acting within the scope of the 
partnership.48  In a more extreme example of vicarious liability, some scholars and 
lawyers have argued the gun manufacturers should be held vicariously liable for the 
injuries and deaths caused by gun violence.49  (Congress and the courts have rejected this 
argument.)50  Joint-and-several liability is sometimes also imposed in cases that are not 
normally characterized as instances of vicarious liability where several parties 
                                                 
44 Id.   
45 Id. at 1079.  In other sorts of joint-and-several liability tort actions, where the defendants are not merely 
being held vicariously liable but are themselves legal responsible at least in part for the tortious harm, then 
rather than indemnification, the defendant who is forced to pay the judgment can seek “contribution” for 
the fair shares owed by the other defendants.  Id. 
46 Indeed, employers typically purchase liability insurance that covers the run-of-the-mill negligence torts 
committed by their employees within the scope of employment. If employers did starting seeking 
indemnification from their employees for these torts, presumably employees would then begin to purchase 
their own separate workplace liability insurance. 
47 See cites supra note __. 
48 Id. at 413. 
49 E.g., Paul R. Bonney, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 1437 (1985); Timothy Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-
Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2000); and Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can Help 
Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 67 (2002).   
50 In 2005 Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which exempts gun 
manufacturers and dealers from being held liable for crimes committed by people using guns.  Pub. L. No. 
109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03) (2005)). 
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contributed to a single plaintiff injury.  In any event, the argument for joint-and-several 
liability in these contexts (whether vicarious or not) can be put in efficiency, cost-
internalization terms that should at this point be familiar.   
Consider the hand-gun example again, which, though extreme, makes the point:  
Even if gun-toting criminals are in some sense the least-cost harm avoiders with respect 
to gun violence, they are also often judgment proof.  What’s more, individuals who are 
likely to use guns to intentionally harm others are also often likely to expend considerable 
effort to avoid detection, which further raises the administrative costs of enforcing the 
tort liability against them.  By contrast, the manufacturers of the guns that are used in 
those crime may, if given the proper incentive, be able to do something at relatively low 
cost (even if not the “lowest possible cost”) to reduce the risk of harm due to gun 
violence, perhaps by redesigning the guns or by altering the way in which they are 
distributed.  That is the care-level argument.  The activity-level argument would be 
similar:  if we assume that gun makers are solvent whereas criminal gun users are not (or 
that, more generally, it is less expensive administratively to enforce the liability on gun 
makers than criminal gun users), then shifting liability vicariously to the manufacturers 
could have beneficial activity-level effects, as gun prices would adjust upward to reflect a 
larger share of the overall social costs associated with gun sales.     
We should also emphasize here an important limitation on vicarious employer 
liability.  As mentioned above, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer is 
liable only for those torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of 
employment.51  (And as we discuss below, an efficiency argument can be made for 
expanding that liability to include independent contractors as well, at least in situations in 
which contractors are likely to be judgment proof.)  Thus, if the worker causes harm 
while engaging in some activity that has nothing to do with his employment relationship 
with the employer, then the employer cannot be held vicariously liable for that loss.  The 
rationale for this so-called “scope-of-employment doctrine” is straightforward:  Whereas 
it might make sense to force the cost of any harm that is “caused” by an enterprise to be 
borne by that enterprise and (through the price mechanism) the parties who benefit from 
that enterprise, the same argument does not apply to costs that are not caused by the 
enterprise.52  The scope-of-employment doctrine is an example of a more general point in 
tort law:  For a tort defendant to be held liable for the harm of another party, the injured 
party must establish, among other things, a causal link between the harm and the 
defendant.     
Much turns then on what counts as a causal link.  Alan Sykes has argued that the 
appropriate definition of causation in the vicarious liability context is similar to the one 
that economists have argued for in other tort contexts: “The crucial variable in this 
analysis is the extent to which the employment relation increases the probability of each 
wrong.”53  Thus he argues that “an enterprise ‘fully causes’ the wrong of an employee if 
                                                 
51 The classic discussion of the scope-of-employment doctrine is Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 
COLUM. L. REV. 444, 716 (1923). 
52 This idea, sometimes referred to as “enterprise liability,” can also be found in the early work of 
Calabresi.  See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 
499, 500 (1961). 
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the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent unemployment of the employee would 
reduce the probability of the wrong to zero.”54  If no such causal link exists between the 
worker’s employment with the employer and the harm caused to the third party, then 
imposing liability for that cost on the employer would, he argues, be inefficient for two 
reasons.  First, such an expansion of vicarious liability would in effect turn the employer 
into the worker’s general liability insurer, which is probably not the most efficient risk-
spreading arrangement.  Second, such an allocation of liability would, by imposing an 
arbitrary cost on the employer, have the effect of inefficiently reducing the scale of the 
enterprise.55  To use an example outside of the employment context, it would be like 
making gun makers liable in tort not for the gun-related injuries caused by their 
customers, but for the auto-related injuries caused by their customers.  Why should those 
auto-accident costs be assigned to the gun-manufacturing business merely because of the 
contractual nexus between the gun makers and the gun owners?   
The scope-of-employment doctrine viewed this way seems sensible enough.  This is 
not to say, however, that vicarious liability beyond the scope of employment would never 
make sense.  For example, if there are efficient care-level investments that the employer 
can easily make that would reduce the probability or severity of the harm to third-parties 
caused by their employees outside of the scope of employment, and if transaction costs 
would prevent the parties from bargaining to this result on their own, then assigning 
liability for the worker’s beyond-the-scope-of-employment harm to the employer might 
be efficient.  It is standard to assume that the cheapest-cost harm avoider is one of the 
parties who caused the harm in the traditional sense of the concept of causation, but that 
need not necessarily be the case.  Put differently, even if the disappearance of the 
employer and the employment relationship would not reduce the expected cost of the 
harm to zero (which is another way of saying, even if the employer and the employment 
relationship is not a “but for” cause of the third-party harm), the employer could 
conceivably still be the cheapest-cost (or next-cheapest-cost) harm avoider.  It is at least 
possible that the employer could take steps on its own to reduce the risk of third-party 
harm – even if the activity in question is outside the scope of employment.  For example, 
the employer could condition some portion of the workers’ pay on their not causing any 
torts to third parties, for which the employer will be liable.56   
Such a liability regime, where employers are held liable for (some) outside-the-scope-
of-employment torts of their employees, could be thought of as a type of compulsory 
employer-provided generally liability insurance.  Having employers’ act as general 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).   
54 Id.   
55 Again, this notion of causation has been applied more generally to tort law.  Steven Shavell, An Analysis 
of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 468 (1980) (“One action is a 
probabilistic cause of a consequence relative to another action if the probability of occurrence of the 
consequence is higher given the first action than given the second.”); Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and 
Foreseeability, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (“Under the normative economic analysis, 
the proximate cause doctrine’s designated role is to expand or shrink the scope of liability, in order to 
achieve efficient deterrence.”). 
56  This idea is consistent with Calabresi’s notion of assigning liability to the “best briber.”  Calabresi, 
supra note __, at 151-53.  Calabresi argues that if it is difficult to identify the cheapest cost avoider, it might 
be efficient to assign liability to the party best able to identify the cheapest cost avoider and then to bribe 
them to make efficient investments in accident avoidance.   
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liability insurers for their workers (and not merely as workplace liability insurers, as they 
currently do) may not be efficient.  But it might be.  It is already the case that employers 
voluntarily provide health insurance for costs incurred by their employees that are 
unrelated to work, and some policymakers and experts (though obviously not all) believe 
that this is a sensible way of allocating health-care risks.57  A similar approach to outside-
of-employment liability risks should, therefore, not be dismissed out of hand.  Whether 
such a reform would in fact be a good idea is, of course, an empirical question that would 
require further investigation that is well beyond the scope of this Article.58   
None of this is to say that deep-pocket vicarious liability, whether limited to the scope 
of employment or not, will always be efficient.  It depends on the comparison of the 
overall social costs (including the regulatory and administrative cost) of imposing and 
enforcing liability on the either the buyer or seller (employer or employee, gun-user or 
gun-maker) or the cost of leaving the liability on the injured victims.  Moreover, in 
situations in which the worker is fully solvent, worker liability is likely the most efficient 
outcome.  That is, sometimes the workers will have the deeper pockets.  But if we assume 
that workers are usually more likely to be judgment proof and employers usually have the 
deeper pockets, and we assume further that ex ante regulation of these sorts of risks is 
often extremely expensive, it seems likely that in vicarious deep-pocket liability will 
often make sense, especially (as mentioned) in situations in which there are reasons to 
believe that the deep pocket also happens to be the least (or a relatively cheap) cost harm 
avoider, as will often be the case in employer/employee relationships – even if not in the 
gun-maker/gun-user case.  In other situations, the balance of costs may cut in the other 
direction, or there may even be situations in which the employers rather than employees 
happen to be the judgment-proof parties, in which case the efficient result may then be 
employee rather than employer liability. 59  We make an analogous point below with 
respect to tax remittance obligations. 
It is also worth emphasizing that when and how to impose vicarious liability are 
complex questions that often present difficult line-drawing problems.  For example, 
                                                 
57 Thus, not only do employers remit premiums to purchase insurance that covers the risks associated with 
workplace injuries to their employees (i.e., workers’ compensation insurance), they also remit premiums to 
cover their employees’ health-related risks that have little or nothing to do with the workplace.  We cannot 
infer from the existence of this practice that it is necessarily efficient.  After all, employer-provided health 
insurance has long been subsidized through the federal income tax laws.  Still, that such a subsidy has been 
left in place for so many years suggests that policymakers must believe that the subsidy has had some 
beneficial effects. 
58 This argument suggests an immediate and obvious Coasean counter-argument:  if the market does not 
already allocate these risks in this way (that is, employers do not already tend to provide their employees 
with general liability insurance as a fringe benefit), then why should the law require it?  The failure of the 
market to provide such a benefit, in other words, could be seen as evidence against its efficiency.  The 
problem with that argument, of course, is that it ignores the incentives – discussed immediately below – 
that employers and their workers have to structure their contractual arrangements so as to externalize such 
liability costs onto third parties.  That is, even though it might be efficient in some situations to assign 
liability for outside-of-employment worker-caused third-party harms to the employer, we should expect 
Coasean bargaining between employer and employees to push in the direction of assigning those liabilities 
to employees, who can benefit from their relatively greater chance of being judgment proof when the time 
to comes to pay the piper.  Such an arrangement could be joint wealth maximizing for employer and worker 
although socially wasteful. 
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under respondeat superior, a principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its agent only if 
the principal had the power to control the manner in which the agent did his job and only 
if the agent commits the tort within the scope of the agency relationship.  In the 
employment context, these requirements are manifest in the common-law distinction 
between “employees,” who are subject to the control of the employer in how they do their 
work, and “independent contractors,” who in theory are not.60  Thus, an employer can be 
held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees but not of independent contractors 
who have been hired to do a job.  On its face this distinction is consistent with notions of 
efficient deterrence and least-cost harm avoider, in that the employer will only be liable if 
it is in a position to control the worker’s behavior.  However, as soon as this sort of line is 
drawn, employers have an incentive to manipulate it, by hiring independent contractors to 
do the work that would otherwise (in the absence of this line in the doctrine) have been 
done by employees or simply to characterize employees as contractors by ceding real or 
apparent control to the workers.  Either strategy could limit the employer’s liability.  In 
addition, because of this distinction in tort law between employees and independent 
contractors, employers have an incentive to hire contractors who are judgment-proof, 
which enables the contractors to avoid liability and essentially allows the contracting 
parties – buyers and sellers – to externalize the third-party harm.61  There are, to be sure, 
potential solutions to this problem.  For example, in situations in which workers have 
caused injuries to third parties, courts, instead of relying on the manipulable distinction 
between employees and contractors, could simply hold the employers liable any time the 
employee is insolvent and the employer is both solvent and at least the next-least-cost 
harm avoider.  Of course, if the employee is expected to be solvent, then a rule that holds 
the employee liable can make sense as well.62   
It should also be noted that ex ante regulation and vicarious deep-pocket liability are 
not the only possible solutions to the judgment-proof problem.  For example, some have 
suggested the possibility of making the judgment-proof party purchase liability insurance 
that fully covers the potential liability.63  For some situations this might be a plausible 
                                                 
60 The definition of an employee for tort law and tax law purposes relies on the same multi-factor common 
law test, which is designed to get at the question of control.  See, e.g., Rev Rul 87-41, 1987-1 CB 296: 
Under the common law rules, the relationship of employer and employee exists when the 
“employer” has the right to control and direct the worker not only as to the result to be 
accomplished but also as to the details and means by which that result is to be 
accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not 
only as to what work has to be done but also as to how the work must be done. In this 
connection, it isn't necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in 
which the services are performed; it's enough if the employer has the right to do so. 
61 Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of Vicarious Liability, in 
EXPLORING TORT LAW (M. Stuart Madden, ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2005).  Of course, if third 
parties are aware of this potential externality, they might be less willing to do business with the employer.  
Thus, there is a way in which the market could induce the employer either to hire only employees or only 
contractors who are demonstrably solvent or who have liability insurance.  This is probably why, for 
example, building contractors often advertise that their workers are “fully insured” or “fully bonded;” that 
is, so that potential customers will not be dissuaded by the fear of suffering an unrecoverable harm. 
62 Arlen and MacLeod, supra note __, makes a similar argument. 
63 In the absence of such a requirement, judgment-proof parties will have an incentive to purchase only 
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solution.  For example, every state requires drivers either to purchase liability insurance 
or otherwise to demonstrate their “financial responsibility” before they are allowed to 
register their automobile.  On the other hand, for other situations, compulsory liability 
insurance is impractical.  And even in contexts where compulsory insurance is a realistic 
possibility, whether it will in general be efficient overall would depend on how the 
overall per unit cost of compulsory liability insurance (including the cost of administering 
such a system) would compare with the alternative costs of c, c', and c''. 
A key lesson that emerges from this analysis is that in these settings Coasean 
bargaining will not always be welfare-enhancing and that sometimes it will be socially 
optimal to make legal entitlements or obligations non-transferable.  Why so?  Imagine 
that assigning liability for third-party harms to employers rather than to employees 
minimized overall social costs (harm plus administrative cost) because employees are 
utterly judgment-proof and the next best alternative, ex ante regulation, is exorbitantly 
costly.  In that situation, if we assigned the liability to the employers but we allowed the 
obligation to be transferable, competition would induce the employers, through Coasean 
bargaining, to shift the burden contractually to employees.  Employers would initially 
save money by shedding the liability, and employees would be willing to accept this 
liability, knowing that they were judgment-proof.  This general process might be thought 
of as a form of intentional or strategic judgment-proofing.  It may be socially inefficient 
because shifting the liability (i.e., the remittance obligation) increases the enforcement 
costs, by which we mean the social costs attendant to noncompliance.  Such costs, which 
are borne directly by tax law enforcers, are not internalized by either the employer or the 
employee. 
How likely is this sort of intentional judgment-proofing in the real world?  We are not 
aware of any systematic empirical studies of this question; however, the torts and the 
bankruptcy literatures both seem to assume that the problem is a real one.  Some scholars 
have noted that there are substantial real-world incentives for parties intentionally to 
judgment proof themselves in order to externalize the costs of potential tort harms onto 
third parties.  For example, a number of scholars have noted the externality that arises 
when corporate defendants become judgment-proof because of the doctrine of limited 
shareholder liability, which provides that a corporate shareholder’s liability for the debts 
of the corporation cannot exceed that shareholder’s equity investment in the 
corporation.64  Moreover, some scholars have even observed that corporations have an 
incentive to strategically render themselves judgment-proof against large tort claims by 
shifting their most dangerous (or highest potential liability) activities into inadequately 
capitalized subsidiaries or brother-sister corporations. 65  In addition, corporate tort 
                                                 
64 Henry Hansmann, & Renier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 
100 YALE L. J. 1879 (1991). 
65 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998).  LoPucki contends that 
corporations have a strong incentive to (and in fact do) bifurcate their businesses into “operating entities,” 
which will face potential tort liabilities, and “asset-owning entities,” which will not – thereby effectively 
rendering the business judgment-proof.  But see James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A 
Response to Lynn LoPucki’s “The Death of Liability,” 107 YALE L. J. 1363 (1998) (arguing that LoPucki 
overstates the problem of corporate judgment proofing); and Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to 
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defendants may adopt the strategy of borrowing against their assets and giving the 
lenders security interests in those assets, which secured interests come before tort 
claimants in priority in the event of bankruptcy, thus increasing the chances that the tort 
victims will go uncompensated.  Potential solutions that have been suggested for this sort 
of intentional judgment proofing include a range of policy proposals, including:  
imposing liability on shareholders (or, as some have suggested, on lenders as well), 
giving tort claimants a higher priority in bankruptcy proceedings, requiring corporations 
to purchase liability insurance, or even increasing the use of direct ex ante regulation by 
government agencies.   
The more general point is that Coasean bargaining can lead to outcomes that are 
privately joint-wealth maximizing but inefficient for society overall.  This problem will 
arise, among other places, when parties are allowed to shift a tort liability to the party 
with respect to whom, for whatever reason (including judgment proofness), enforcing the 
ex post liability would be most socially costly.66  As we discuss below, there is an 
analogous set of problems in the tax context.  That is, although the conventional wisdom 
among economists is that the assignment of tax remittance responsibility is irrelevant to 
efficiency and distributive outcomes, we show that, once enforcement and compliance 
costs are taken into account, those invariance conclusions may not obtain.  We begin by 
presenting the conventional wisdom concerning the tax invariance results mentioned in 
the introduction.   
 
d.  From Torts to Tax 
 
Before proceeding further to the tax analogy, we need to emphasize the fundamental 
differences between the tort and tax liabilities.  In the tort scenario that we have been 
focusing on, private actions undertaken in the context of contractual relationships inflict 
harm or the risk of harm on other private parties.  (There are of course many other tort 
settings that do not involve contractual relationships, but they are less relevant to the tax 
comparison.)  The efficiency motivations for imposing tort liability in such a case are 
well known in the torts literature: to ensure that the right amount of the private activity is 
undertaken and also that the right amount of harm-reducing steps is taken (the activity-
level and care-level effects mentioned above.)  We might think of the costs incurred by 
parties to reduce the actual risks of harm to others as tort “compliance costs,” which are 
analogous to the costs incurred by taxpayers to comply with the tax laws.  Once a tort 
liability regime is in place, however, private parties may also take steps (other than 
activity-level and care-level changes) to reduce their effective liability for a given harm.  
For example, they might attempt to judgment-proof themselves.  Or they might even 
attempt to “cover up” their tort, by taking steps to make it difficult to trace the causal 
                                                                                                                                                 
(finding that firms with relatively large potential tort liabilities do not reveal a greater propensity to use 
secured debt, suggesting that the motive to “redistribute” from tort plaintiffs to secured creditors plays little 
role). 
66 Below we discuss what changes when it is not socially optimal to completely enforce the liability. 
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connection between the product and the harm.67  We might think of these costs as being 
akin to “evasion” on the tax side.  Therefore, enforcing the tort liability itself generates 
costs – the costs of running the court system and establishing causation and liability -- 
that we call “administrative costs.”  To distinguish these issues, we have introduced the 
semantic distinction between the least-cost harm avoider (the party who can most 
efficiently reduce the harm or risk of harm by either care-level or activity-level changes, 
or both) and the least-cost liability avoider (the party who can most efficiently minimize 
the liability award, for a given amount of harm). 
Contrast the above-described tort situation with the case of a tax.  First we need to 
distinguish two types of taxes: those designed to correct externalities (sometimes called 
Pigouvian taxes) and those designed merely to raise revenue to spend on public goods.  
Pigouvian taxes are used much like tort law, to internalize externalities.  Thus, if a given 
activity produces negative externalities, levying a tax on that activity equal to the 
marginal external social cost can be efficiency-enhancing.  Thus, the primary efficiency 
effect of a Pigouvian tax is the activity-level effect mentioned above, as the tax moves the 
amount of the externality-generating activity (down) toward its optimal level.  A 
Pigouvian tax can also, in theory, have efficiency-enhancing care-level effects, insofar as 
the tax can be adjusted ex post for the harm-reducing steps that are undertaken.  Such ex 
post adjustments to Pigouvian taxes, however, are rarely if ever actually made.  The 
Pigouvian tax reduces the private utility of the parties involved in the market, but 
produces an offsetting social benefit to the extent the collected revenue is spent on public 
goods.   
In the case of non-Pigouvian taxes, the tax is not imposed with the objective of 
reducing the level of the taxed activity.68  Indeed, any reduction in the amount of the 
taxed activity is an unintended, if unavoidable, negative consequence of a non-Pigouvian 
tax.69  Thus, an optimal non-Pigouvian tax system seeks, other things equal, to minimize 
the cost of these behavioral consequences, known as distortions.  The only social benefit 
of such taxes arises from the uses to which the tax revenue is put.  Because the revenue 
has social value, it is generally socially optimal for the government to expend resources 
to ensure that tax liability is remitted. In drawing out the analogy between tort and tax, 
we concentrate in what follows on non-Pigouvian taxes. 
 
4.  Coase Meets the TRIPs 
a.  The Standard Tax Remittance Invariance Story:  Zero Compliance and 
Administrative Costs 
We have argued that the Coase Theorem and the law-and-economics literature on 
torts, including Calabresi’s notion of identifying the least-cost harm avoider, primarily 
address the problem of choosing the optimal legal responsibility for some expected harm.  
                                                 
67 The tobacco industry did this for many years, producing their own research results that supposedly 
disproved or undermined the link between smoking and various illnesses. 
68 A negative Pigouvian tax, or a Pigouvian subsidy, is designed to increase the level of the activity.  In 
general, then, Pigouvian taxes/subsidies aim to change the level of some activity, pushing in the direction 
of optimality. 
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The problem to which we now turn, which is identical in some ways to the Coasean and 
Calabresian questions but different in others, is the problem of choosing the optimal 
assignment of the legal obligation to remit a given tax liability to the government.   
The standard view among economists is that the assignment of the tax remittance 
obligation has no effect on the incidence of the tax in question.  This is the TRIPI notion 
mentioned in the introduction, and something like it (though without the catchy acronym) 
can be found in every modern public finance text.  The assumptions that underlie the 
TRIPI assertion typically are left implicit, but the basic story goes something like this:  
As above, it is standard to assume a competitive market setting – many small sellers and 
buyers, free entry and exit, no externalities, perfect information, long-run equilibrium 
price and quantity.  The setting is often a tax triggered by sales of either commodities or 
labor.  For simplicity, we assume, as does the literature, that the taxes are assessed on a 
per-unit basis, although a very similar sort of analysis, with essentially the same result, 
can be used for proportional taxes on value (i.e., so-called ad valorem taxes).  It is also 
implicitly assumed in these models that there are no administrative costs or compliance 
costs (such as the costs of learning the tax laws, gathering the relevant information, and 
filing the appropriate forms), or that the administrative plus compliance costs are exactly 
the same among all remitters.  These are important assumptions that we relax below.   
Given all of these assumptions, the results follow immediately:  no matter who – 
seller or buyer – is assigned the legal responsibility for remitting the tax to the 
government, the results will be the same.  The distributional consequences of the tax will 
depend not on the assignment of the remittance obligation, but on the relative supply and 
demand elasticities.  This is exactly the same as in the Coasean externality case above.  In 
addition, the degree of inefficiency or deadweight loss generated by the tax will depend 
not on the remittance responsibility but on the relevant elasticities: the less elastic the 
supply or demand for the good or service is, the smaller the deadweight loss. 
We can illustrate our points with another stylized example, this one taken straight 
from the pages of any public finance text.  If we start from Figure 2, which again 
represents the market for labor provided by workers and purchased by employers, we see 
again that there is an initial equilibrium price and quantity of labor sold and consumed.  
Next Figure 5 depicts what happens when we introduce a per unit tax on labor earnings 
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This figure deals specifically with a per-unit tax of t that must be remitted by the seller 
(here, the worker).  As is standard, the consequences of such a tax (and remittance 
obligation) can be shown by a parallel shift upward in the supply curve, just as in Figure 
2.  Although the remittance obligation is placed on workers (the suppliers of labor), the 
economic burden of the tax will be shared by the suppliers and consumers, through the 
changes in the prices they receive and pay, respectively; and the sharing of this burden 
between suppliers and consumers will depend on the relative supply and demand 
elasticities for labor.  Thus, the analysis of the sharing of the tax burden is identical to the 
analysis of the sharing of the harm in Figure 2.  The analysis of the overall social cost 
created by the introduction of a tax, however, is different from the Figure 2 analysis, for 
the simple reason that introducing a new tax (other than a Pigouvian tax) is different from 
introducing a new cost.70   
The difference is straightforward:  When the tax, t, is introduced, it produces tax 
revenue, represented by the area IEGK, which, unlike the same area in Figure 2, is not a 
deadweight loss to society, but rather represents a transfer of purchasing power from 
private agents to the government.  In a baseline case where the social value of the tax 
revenue per dollar is the same as the social value of a dollar of foregone private surplus, 
                                                 
70 We can imagine that the new cost assigned in Figures 2 and 3 are actually per unit Pigouvian taxes 
designed to internalize some external cost that is created by the production or use of widgets.  The effect on 
prices and quantities would be the same, but the effect on social cost would have to reflect the social cost 
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the social (or deadweight) loss is the difference between the decline in consumer and 
producer surplus, IEBGK, and the increase in tax revenue, IEGK; this difference is equal 
to the classic Harberger triangle representation of deadweight loss, the area EBG.  This 
social cost arises because the tax imposes a “wedge” between the price paid by employers 
and the price received by workers, causing labor output to fall.  The area EBG represents 
the social cost of the distortion of output from x0 to x1; the vertical distance between the S 
curve and the D curve represents the social cost of each marginal unit of the forgone 
output, which is the difference between the value to the consumer and the value of the 
resources needed to produce it. 
And now for the tax invariance result.  Figure 6 shows the effects of a unit tax of t on 
wages in the case where the employer must remit.   
 
As in the comparison between Figure 2 and 3, everything is exactly the same as between 
Figure 5 and 6: the wage paid by the employer and the wage received by the worker, the 
change in employer and worker surplus, the change in output, the tax revenue collected, 
and the deadweight loss.  Thus, not only is the allocation of the burden between 
employers and workers invariant (which we have called TRIPI), but also there is exactly 
the same degree of inefficiency (or deadweight loss) produced by either remittance 
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assignment (TRIPE).  Again, this is the standard tax invariance explanation that is 
conventional wisdom among tax economists.71   
 
b. Compliance Costs 
As was the case with the invariance conclusions above in our contractual version 
of the Coase Theorem, a key implicit assumption of the standard demonstrations of these 
tax invariance propositions is that there are no administrative or compliance costs 
generated in the tax collection process, where administrative costs are again defined as 
those borne in the first instance by the government (but ultimately borne by individual 
taxpayers) and compliance costs are defined as those borne in the first instance by private 
parties (though these too may be shifted to parties other than those who “remit” the 
compliance costs).  In the real world, of course, just as a tort system, or any other 
regulatory system, generates administrative and compliance costs, so too do tax systems. 
To expand our analysis to deal with these realities, we begin by assuming that 
taxpayers do indeed have to incur compliance costs to satisfy their tax obligations.  They 
have to learn the relevant tax laws and regulations, gather financial information that bear 
on their tax remittance obligations, file forms of various sorts, calculate the appropriate 
amount of tax and then remit it to the government; or they have to pay someone to do all 
those things for them.  Moreover, we assume initially that, as between employers and 
employees, compliance costs are exactly the same.  Specifically, we assume that 
whichever party is assigned the remittance burden will have to incur a per-unit 
compliance cost of c, and the other non-remitting party will not have to incur any 
compliance costs.  For simplicity, we assume that this compliance cost is a constant 
proportion of the amount of the good or service being produced in the transaction that 
triggers the tax.  Thus, for every additional unit of labor sold and purchased in our 
example, the compliance cost goes up a proportional amount. These assumptions are 
entirely analogous to the assumptions in the previous section on tort liability. We put 
administrative costs aside for now.  Given all of these assumptions, Figure 7 shows how 
to analyze compliance costs, when the per-unit tax of t is remitted by the supplier, who 
also directly shoulders the per-unit compliance cost of c.   
The total deadweight loss to society is represented by the difference between the 
decline in consumer plus producer surplus, VUBNR, and the tax revenue collected, 
SMNR, which is equal to VUMS plus UBN.  VUMS is the compliance cost and UBN is 
the social cost of distorting production/consumption from x0 to x2. 
 
                                                 
71 Slemrod addresses the situations under which TRIPI and TRIPE fail, without addressing the analogy to 
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Figure 8 shows that the effect would be no different if remittance obligation were 
placed on the employer, which, again, would produce the same per-unit level of 
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The point is analogous to the point that we analyzed in the comparison between Figures 2 
and 3:  the remittance obligation (and thus the identity of the party who directly incurs the 
compliance costs) is in equilibrium immaterial to the impact of these costs on the welfare 
of both parties and the allocation of resources.   
Now we introduce the possibility of asymmetric compliance costs, where one class of 
parties (buyers or sellers, employers or employees) has lower compliance costs than the 
other.  When might this be?  Economies of scale to learning the tax laws, to gathering the 
relevant tax information, and to filing forms with the tax authorities, would suggest that 
bigger is better:  that larger taxpayers would present lower compliance costs per unit of 
tax remitted and collected.  For example, it seems likely that it would be cheaper to have 
the one employer (especially if it is a large employer) file the relevant forms and transfer 
the appropriate funds to the government rather than have dozens, hundreds, or thousands 
of employees do so separately.   
The same argument could be made about the sales tax:  we would expect, in general, 
that large retail sellers will be the least-cost remitters of the tax on a given sale as 
compared with relatively small consumers.  These conclusions are analogous to the 
assumptions sometimes made in tort law to justify respondeat superior liability of 
employers for employee torts: that the employer can reduce the harm at a cost both less 
than the reduction in expected accident costs and less than the compliance cost of the 
employees. Recall that this was part of the argument for deep-pocket vicarious liability 
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context of tax remittance.  How would this fit with our model?  Does it alter the standard 
tax invariance results that are so commonly demonstrated in public finance textbooks?    
It depends.  Are we in a Coasean world – with zero transaction costs and freely 
transferable entitlements and obligations – or are we not?  If transaction costs between 
buyers and sellers (employers and employees) are zero, and if the parties are allowed to 
reallocate the remittance obligation between them as they see fit, then the parties will 
shift the remittance obligation to the least-cost remitter (here the party with the lower 
compliance costs), and, ignoring administrative and enforcement issues, social welfare 
will be maximized.72   If, however, transaction costs prevent such efficient shifting of 
remittance responsibility, then overall social welfare will be maximized only by imposing 
the remittance obligation on the least-cost remitter. 73  Note also that, in terms of 
distribution, with either result (the efficient assignment of remittance responsibility to the 
least-cost remitter or the inefficient assignment to the other party) the distribution of 
utility between employers and employees will be determined by the relative elasticities of 
supply and demand.   
 
c. Asymmetric Administrative Costs:  Judgment-Proof, Dishonest, or 
Otherwise Hard-to-Reach Taxpayers 
At this point we introduce the possibility that alternative tax remittance obligations 
will produce asymmetric tax administrative costs as between buyers and sellers – in our 
continuing example, as between employers and employees.  With respect to a tax on 
wages, for example, if it could be shown that the costs to the government of 
administering (i.e., enforcing) an employer-based tax remittance obligation are lower 
than the cost of administering an employee-based remittance obligation, that would be an 
independent justification for placing the remittance responsibility on employers – 
independent of the compliance-cost argument.74  And the same could be said of a retail 
sales tax, assuming that the tax remittance obligations of sellers are cheaper to enforce 
than the tax remittance obligations of buyers. 
What might be the source of such differential administrative costs?  In the torts 
context, we focused on insolvency or judgment-proofness as the source of differential 
administrative expense, because internalizing costs to a judgment-proof party may 
require costly ex ante regulation or compulsory liability insurance.  Judgment-proofness 
is relevant in the tax context as well, although it is somewhat less of a problem both 
because of the nature of tax liabilities (which arise more slowly and predictably than do 
tort liabilities) and because of the special privileges typically afforded the tax collector in 
bankruptcy.75  Still, some individual taxpayers, especially taxpayers who live from 
                                                 
72 An example is the remittance by the lender rather than homeowner for property taxes.  This may be 
related to which party loses in the event of foreclosure.  Slemrod, supra note __ (2008). 
73 Craswell, supra note __. 
74 For now we continue to assume that the government expends whatever resources are necessary to collect 
the entire legal tax obligation. 
75 For example, with U.S. federal taxes (income, gift, or estate), the U.S. government automatically receives 
a lien against all the assets of a taxpayer if the taxpayer does not pay the taxes upon “demand.”  Sec. 6321. 
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paycheck to paycheck, may have relatively few resources with which to pay a large tax 
judgment.  Indeed, one justification commonly given for the current remittance regime 
for employment taxes in the U.S. is precisely this concern about judgment-proofness.  As 
one well-known commentator put it, “[w]ithout a pay-as-you-earn system making the 
employer a ‘deputy tax collector,’ it would be difficult if not impossible to collect taxes 
from employees who spend their wages as fast as they are received.”76  Likewise, 
corporate taxpayers are vulnerable to bankruptcy, which can leave them with little money 
with which to pay its tax liability.  In any event, if the tax remittance obligation is 
assigned to a party who ends up being insolvent, the tax is obviously less likely to be 
collected than otherwise absent the expenditure of additional administrative resources.   
The possibility of an insolvent tax remitter is not the only potential source of 
asymmetric administrative costs.  It could also be argued that it is inherently cheaper (per 
dollar of revenue raised) for the tax authority to police large taxpayers, because of the 
economics of scale in tax enforcement.  It is cheaper, for example, for the government to 
audit a single large employer than to audit all of the employers’ employees separately.  In 
addition, corporate taxpayers may have more financially at stake in their reputations and 
may therefore be less willing to risk being found guilty of tax evasion.77  If that is true, 
the per-dollar cost of administering an income tax system in which the remittance 
obligation is placed on large employers would be lower than the per-dollar cost of a 
system that placed the obligation on employees.  The same argument could be made with 
respect to sales taxes.  That is, imposing the sales tax remittance obligation on large retail 
sellers to remit is almost certainly less costly administratively than asking each retail 
purchaser to remit the tax.  We acknowledge, of course, that large corporations also have 
agency problems; and sometimes corporate management may be more willing to engage 
in tax fraud than even the corporations’ shareholders would prefer.  On the other hand, 
the more employees that are involved, the more difficult it is to maintain a pattern of 
outright tax evasion, as the possibility of detection rises with the number of potential 
whistleblowers.   
What these arguments suggest is that, in situations in which the policymaker is 
choosing who between two contractually connected parties should bear the tax remittance 
responsibility for the tax triggered by the parties’ interaction, the best way to achieve the 
policymaker’s intended combination of tax revenue and distributive burdens (at lowest 
cost) is to impose the remittance obligation on the larger, wealthier party – the one most 
likely to have assets with which to pay the tax and the one whose tax compliance will be 
cheapest (per dollar of tax collected) to ensure (that is, the one who, if given the 
remittance obligation, will give rise to the lowest administrative costs of tax 
enforcement).  Notice that this administrative cost argument cuts in the same direction as 
the least-cost remitter argument, which also points in the direction of giving the 
remittance obligation to the larger, wealthier party – the one who could benefit from 
economies of scale with respect to tax compliance costs.  This convergence is similar to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Such tax liens automatically take priority over the taxpayer’s own claim to the property and, shortly 
thereafter, over all other creditors other than secured creditors whose interests were perfected earlier.    
76 BITTKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME, GIFTS, & ESTATES ¶ 111.5.2 (quoting 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. US, 623 F2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). 
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the convergence of arguments, discussed above, in favor of vicarious tort liability, as both 
least-cost harm avoider and administrative/enforcement cost arguments favored 
respondeat superior liability under certain assumptions.  In sum, just as deep-pocket tort 
liability can be justified in the tort context on efficiency grounds, it can also be justified 
in the tax context on similar grounds. 
Of course, size is not everything.  There may be situations in which, irrespective of 
the relative size or wealth of the parties to a given transaction, one or the other is more 
likely to be beyond the reach of the tax authority (which we can think of as giving rise to 
very high administrative costs).  This will be a problem when one of the parties is either 
outside of the taxing jurisdiction or is readily able to leave the jurisdiction.  For example, 
imagine a taxable transaction in which the payer is within the taxing jurisdiction and the 
payee is outside the taxing jurisdiction.  If the tax authority does not require the payer to 
withhold and remit tax on the payment, there may be no other opportunity to collect the 
tax, as the payee will be effectively judgment-proof – even if the payee has more overall 
assets than the payer.  This issue can obviously arise in the international context, where 
payments are made by U.S. taxpayers to foreign individuals or entities, or in the domestic 
U.S. context, where state taxing authorities are trying to collect taxes on interstate 
transactions.  Some might argue that in such a situation the best (or fairest) approach 
would be to find a way to have the payee remit the tax.  Our point is that, even if that 
were possible (and we are assuming for the moment that it is), the incidence would be the 
same whether the payer or payee remits, and the administrative cost of enforcing a 
domestic payer remittance obligation will likely be much lower. 
We should also note another analogy between the tax and tort remittance questions.  
In the tort context, we noted that it will not always be socially efficient to allow the 
parties to transfer the remittance obligation contractually between them; recall the 
discussion of strategic judgment proofing.  A similar argument would apply in the tax 
context.  Once we allow for such differential administrative costs, whether because of the 
economies of scale, the judgment-proof problem, the foreign or missing taxpayer 
problem, or because of differences in inherent willingness to evade taxes, then allowing 
the remittance responsibility to be transferable does not automatically lead to the socially 
efficient outcome because a transfer of remittance responsibility may reduce the sum of 
compliance costs but increase administrative costs by more than the compliance cost 
savings.  In terms of the figures, an important difference between the analysis of Figure 4 
and that of Figure 7 arises if the identity of the tax remitter affects the administrative cost 
of the tax collected.  In this case the social cost of ILMS plus LBN shown in Figure 7 
misses one component of the social cost.  It is possible that moving to the low-cost 
remitter, where cost is measured in terms of compliance costs and distortion alone, might 
not represent the minimum social-cost remitter, if the former facilitates tax evasion or, in 
other words, makes tax enforcement more costly.   The overall efficient tax remittance 
arrangement should minimize the sum of three cost elements: distortion cost, compliance 
cost, and administrative cost.     
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d.  Optimal Evasion and Taxpayer Heterogeneity 
 
So far we have implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) assumed that compliance costs 
and, in particular, administrative costs may have to be incurred to achieve compliance 
with the tax laws, but that, once these costs are incurred, complete compliance is 
achieved.  In that context, we noted that the TRIPs do not hold, so long as there are 
asymmetric compliance or administrative costs as between the parties to the transaction 
that triggers the tax.  What changes in our analysis if we recognize the fact that, despite 
optimal investments to ensure compliance, there will nevertheless be some successful 
evasion?  Put differently, how does the analysis change if full compliance with the tax 
law is not a certainty?  This may be because it is impossible to achieve full compliance.  
Or it may be because it is not worth the cost; that is, because of the nature of the social 
welfare function, there may – indeed, will almost certainly be – a point at which the cost 
of achieving marginally improved compliance exceeds the marginal benefit.  In such a 
case, what is the effect on TRIPS?  What does it mean for the optimal allocation of tax 
remittance responsibility?   
As we argue in this section, the tax invariance propositions still do not hold.  What’s 
more, to the extent residual non-compliance is distributed heterogeneously across the 
population of taxed parties, it turns out that (ignoring how the tax dollars are spent) the 
introduction of a non-Pigouvian tax may actually improve the welfare of the 
noncompliant parties while decreasing the welfare of the compliant parties.  A similar 
point can be made with respect to heterogeneous tort compliance. 
Before we get to that result, though, notice that if tax compliance is uncertain the 
effect of a tax on equilibrium prices will depend on the expectations each side – buyer 
and seller – has about their eventual tax liability and on any attendant cost associated 
with (successful or unsuccessful) noncompliance.  In the standard model of optimal 
evasion, individuals will evade as long as the reduction in their expected tax and penalty 
remittances exceeds the marginal private cost of the evasion, where private cost includes 
the costs to the tax remitters of disguising their behavior to the tax collector as well as the 
cost of remitters’ increased risk-bearing owing to the uncertainty in after-tax income that 
the evasion creates.  Because (it is assumed that) the marginal private costs are increasing 
with additional investments in evasion, whereas the marginal private gain is not, 
eventually the marginal private gain from evasion will fall short of the marginal private 
cost.  Because of the costs incurred, the net private gain will be less than the expected tax 
saving.78 
Governments have access to a number of policy actions that can reduce evasion, but it 
generally is not socially optimal to eliminate evasion completely, just as it is not optimal 
to expend the resources necessary to eliminate all torts or to expunge all robbery.  This is 
true even when one enforcement tool is the financial penalty for detected evasion, which 
is not a social cost, because very high penalties may have consequences that are socially 
costly.  This conclusion has important consequences for our analysis.  To see this, 
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imagine that the remittance responsibility for a given tax is switched from one party from 
whom collection would be inexpensive (in terms of compliance and administrative costs), 
so inexpensive such that full compliance is socially optimal, to another from whom 
collection would be expensive.   The optimal policy response would not in general be to 
maintain full compliance and incur the now-considerable administrative costs of so 
doing.  Rather the optimal policy responses would be a combination of somewhat higher 
administrative expenditure plus allowing a lower level of compliance.  This lower level 
of compliance entails social costs, including higher risk-bearing costs and perhaps the 
need to raise somewhat (not necessarily equal) more revenue in some other (costly) way.  
Thus, once the idea of socially optimal evasion is recognized, the increase in 
administrative costs does not accurately measure the increase in social costs from moving 
to an inferior remittance regime 
Now recognize that the inclination and opportunity to evade successfully is 
heterogeneous – not only as between buyers and sellers (as we have already discussed) 
but within the class of buyers and within the class of sellers.79   From an ex ante 
perspective, people (including those people who make decisions for firms) differ both in 
their intrinsic honesty and in their available opportunities for evasion.80  From an ex post 
perspective, some acts of evasion are detected by enforcement systems, while others are 
not; of those acts that are detected, the penalties may differ.  Although it is the aggregate 
response to a tax rate change that will determine how much a given tax rate change 
affects the consumer and producer prices, respectively, the effect on any one person or 
firm will depend on the price change and on their own exposure to the price, which now 
depends on their evasion behavior – which again turns on their ex ante characteristics and 
their ex post results – as well as their (other) preferences and technology.   
To see the implications for the TRIPs of these more realistic assumptions, consider a 
tax on the income from house painting.  Assume that the remittance obligation is placed 
on the painter rather than the paintee and that half of housepainters are scrupulously 
honest while the other half are scrupulously dishonest.  Assume further that there is no 
private cost incurred to effect the evasion, that the probability of detection is zero, and, of 
course, that all parties are fully informed of all of these facts.  What happens when the tax 
is introduced?  The supply curve shifts up by only one-half of the tax rate, since only the 
one-half of the painters who actually will remit the taxes they owe will require a higher 
pre-tax payment to elicit the same work.  The impact on equilibrium prices as always 
depends on the relative supply and demand elasticities, here for house painting services.  
For the sake of simplicity, say that the supply and demand elasticities are equal (and not 
affected by the evasion possibilities—see Section 4.e ).  In this case the price to 
                                                 
79 Medema and Zerbe make a separate observation about the impact of heterogeneity: that when people 
have heterogeneous utility functions, the assignment of property rights can affect allocation because it 
changes aggregate demand functions, and therefore equilibrium production.  For example, if the injurers 
have a higher wealth elasticity of demand for chili peppers than the injured, assigning the property rights to 
the injurers will increase the aggregate demand for chili peppers, and therefore their price, unless all goods 
are produced at constant cost (and therefore equilibrium prices are always unaffected by demand 
conditions).   Medema & Zerbe, supra note __. 
80 To the extent that heterogeneous evasion opportunities apply to categories of employer and employee, 
there will be market adjustments in the remuneration of that activity; the following examples therefore 
apply to heterogeneity not associated with such categories.  See the example of housepainters below. 
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consumers rises by exactly ¼ of the tax: one-half of the one-half-of-the-tax upward shift 
in the supply curve.  As long as the price received by noncompliant painters is the same 
as the price paid by consumer (i.e., there is no tax wedge), the price they each receive 
goes up by this same amount.  As a result, the non-compliant painters are better off 
because of this tax.  In contrast, the price received by honest housepainters falls by three-
quarters of the tax (i.e., the full tax remitted offset by a price increase of ¼ of the tax).  
An identical result could be reached if the heterogeneity was not with respect to inherent 
honesty, but judgment proofness; for example, if we assumed that half were judgment 
proof, half were not, and detection was a certainty. 
Consider now a slightly different example involving a more general labor income tax.  
Specifically, imagine a labor income tax that is to be remitted by employers, and assume 
that the pre- and post-tax wages have adjusted to reflect this tax.  With one exception:  
one small firm does not remit the tax, and it costlessly and completely gets away with it.  
(The firm’s employees do not suspect, and are unaware of, the evasion).  In this situation, 
the owners of the lone non-compliant firm are better off because in the new equilibrium 
they incur the lower after-tax wage rather than the pre-tax wage incurred by all other 
firms—indeed, they are better off because of the imposition of the tax.  This occurs 
because the market adjustment in wages depends on the responses of the preponderance 
of tax-complying firms, not on the behavior of the relatively few (or single, in this 
example) non-compliant firms.  That is, as long as the non-compliant firms remain only a 
small part of the market, they benefit from the decline in the after-tax wage expected by 
their (assumed to be homogeneous) workers, but they do not remit the tax that is the 
cause of that decline.  We might say, then, that this result follows from the heterogeneity 
of firms with respect to their inclination and ability to evade taxes.  If, alternatively, the 
remittance obligation were placed on employees instead of employers, then the employer 
heterogeneity would not matter, and what would matter is the heterogeneity of 
employees.  Which side is given the obligation to remit will not affect the relative burden 
on average as between employers and employees, but will affect which particular parties 
(individuals and firms) win and lose, and by how much. Thus, TRIPI is violated in 
circumstances in which there is heterogeneity among taxpayers with respect to their 
willingness or ability to evade. 
A similar analysis can be applied in the tort context.  The best analogy would be the 
one discussed above involving parties who intentionally judgment proof themselves 
against potential tort liabilities.  A firm or individual who knowingly engages in some 
activity that poses a risk of third-party harm that exceeds the injurer’s ability to reimburse 
can be understood as a sort of tort liability evader.  And the willingness and ability to 
engage in that sort of behavior is almost certainly heterogeneously distributed across 
parties, even within industries.  As a result of this fact, of course, the naïve Coasean 
prediction that the assignment of liability should have no distributional consequences 
does not hold.  Moreover, this argument lends credence to the familiar observation that 
the introduction of any tax or legal restriction actually increases the utility of the 
noncompliant parties (vis a vis the world without the tax or restriction), so long as there 
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e.  Non-proportional collection costs 
To this point we have assumed that aggregate compliance costs are proportional to 
the aggregate quantity produced/consumed (i.e., they are a fixed per-unit constant), 
although we have allowed the costs at any aggregate output level to depend on what the 
remittance arrangements are.  We have, though, hinted at the likelihood that the 
magnitude and nature of these costs may depend on the micro details of the markets 
involved.  In this section we pursue the implications of looking at the micro-foundations 
of enforcement and compliance costs.   
To fix ideas, consider a stylized world in which remittance-related compliance costs 
are completely inframarginal, in the sense that the per-period cost is unaffected by the 
extent of a participant’s involvement (i.e., how much they buy, or sell) in a taxed activity, 
but only by the fact of participating in the market.  In other words, there are fixed, but no 
variable, costs of compliance.  Let the remittance burden be on firms.  Some, presumably 
mostly small, firms will no longer be profitable, and will drop out of the market.  This 
means that the supply curve shifts upward, and the new equilibrium price will be higher 
depending on the relative supply and demand elasticities.  But the higher price is of 
greater value to bigger firms than to smaller firms (because they sell more), so that the 
new equilibrium will have implications for the distribution of firm sizes.  Moreover, as 
above, these consequences would differ if the remittance responsibility was placed on 
consumers.  In the latter case firm heterogeneity would be immaterial, and consumer 
heterogeneity would affect the outcome. 
Consider the consequences if the remittance responsibility was placed on consumers, 
with a compliance cost triggered by participating in the market but unrelated to the extent 
of participation.  Some consumers, presumably small ones, would be dissuaded from 
entering the market, and so the demand curve would shift down.  This would cause a 
decline in the market price, depending on the relative supply and demand elasticities, but 
the decline would not offset the utility loss equally for small and large consumers; small 
consumers would be relatively worse off, because the price decline is of relatively little 
importance compared to the fixed compliance cost. 
When there is evasion, having the remittance responsibility can also change the 
elasticity of response.  For example, consider the consequences if the private cost of an 
employee evading a given amount of labor income is lower when the true amount of 
labor income is higher.81  This implies that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
the pretax wage rate will be different from its elasticity with respect to the tax rate.  It 
also reduces the effective marginal tax rate on supplying labor, because of the “evasion-
facilitating” character of labor supply, and will in general alter both the height of the 
labor supply curve and its elasticity.  To the extent it affects the elasticity of labor supply, 
the incidence of imposing any cost, including a compliance cost, will be changed.  If the 
elasticity of labor supply is larger (smaller) than otherwise, then any cost will be more 
shifted away from (toward) labor than otherwise.  If alternatively the employer had to 
remit and had evasion possibilities, then it is labor demand that is potentially affected, 
with different consequences for the incidence of tax liability or compliance cost.  Only if 
                                                 
81 Joel Slemrod, A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation, 9 INTERNATIONAL TAX AND 
PUB. FIN. 119 (2001). 
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the pretax wage elasticity and tax rate elasticity of labor supply bear a particular 
symmetric relationship with the pretax wage and tax rate elasticity of labor supply will 
the remittance responsibility be irrelevant for the pretax and after-tax wage rate. 
f. Equivalences 
A transitivity property applies to the tax remittance invariance principles, TRIPI and 
TRIPE: if tax system A has identical consequences as tax system B, and tax system B has 
identical consequences as tax system C, then tax system A has identical consequences as 
tax system C.   Stringing together a series of transitivity relationships reveals some well-
known equivalences among tax systems with very different remittance arrangements, 
where equivalence means identical incidence, allocation, and efficiency consequences.  
Consider the retail sales tax.  We have already discussed that the tax triggered by retail 
sales could, in principle, be remitted by the consumers or by the retail establishments.  In 
the latter case, which is the norm for all retail sales taxes for reasons already discussed, 
there must be a mechanism to distinguish business sales made to other businesses from 
business sales to consumers; in U.S. states’ retail sales taxes this is done by issuing 
business exemption certificates to business purchasers.82   
Now recognize that, in the absence of enforcement concerns, the combination of a tax 
that must be remitted by one party to a transaction and an equal credit offered to the other 
party is equivalent to levying no net tax at all.  Next observe that a value-added tax 
(VAT) is equivalent to a tax triggered by retail sales plus offsetting taxes and credits 
triggered by every business-to-business sale.  Because each of these offsetting tax-and-
credit remittance obligations net to zero, the value-added tax thus is—absent enforcement 
concerns—equivalent to a retail sales tax, as all tax textbooks note.83   
What is the advantage of, as a VAT does, adding remittance obligations (and credit 
entitlements) for non-retail businesses to a retail sales tax, and thereby in principle 
involving all businesses in the tax system?  The answer lies in the administrative and 
enforcement implications.  Because of the difficulty of involving the multitude of 
consumers in the tax system, a retail sales tax has no natural way to check that the retailer 
has remitted the correct amount.  But business-to-business sales allow for the possibility 
of such a check, in that the credit of the purchasing business is contingent on an invoice 
provided by the seller attesting to its remittance.  Moreover, under a VAT the identity of 
the purchaser (i.e., whether it is a final consumer or a business) is no longer relevant, so 
business exemption certificates (and the evasion they induce and the enforcement they 
require) are not needed.  Thus, applying the framework of this article, we might say that, 
although the VAT and the retail sales tax are equivalent assuming equal administrative 
costs, once we acknowledge the relatively high administrative costs that would be 
                                                 
82 Abuse of such exemption certificates is a major enforcement concern. 
83 To see this, imagine a highly stylized economy consisting of two firms.  Firm A uses $30 of labor to 
produce its product, which it sells for $40 to Firm B, making a $10 profit.  Firm B uses Firm A’s output as 
an input, and hires $45 of labor to produce a product that it sells to consumers for $100, making a  $15 
profit.  A 10% retail sales tax would collect $10 from Firm B.  Under a VAT, the tax base is receipts minus 
purchases from other businesses.  Thus, a 10% value added tax would collect $4 from Firm A and $6 from 
Firm B, for a total of $10.  Starting from a retail sales tax , adding the business-to-business transactions to 
the tax base adds $4 of tax liability on Firm A and a $4 credit for Firm B, and thus an additional net tax 
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necessary to achieve equivalent levels of compliance under the retail sales tax, the VAT 
is overall superior.84    
The value-added tax is turned into the Hall-Rabushka flat tax by adding one more set 
of exactly offsetting tax obligations and credit entitlements—between firms and 
employees.85  Under the flat tax (but not under a VAT), firms can deduct payments to 
workers (i.e., credit taxes) and the workers “owe” tax on their wages and salaries.  If the 
business tax and labor income tax rate are equal, this is equivalent to levying no tax at all.  
In contrast to the switch from a retail sales tax to a VAT under the usual remittance 
arrangements for each, though, the switch from a VAT to a Hall-Rabushka flat tax need 
not entail any change in remittance responsibility because firms could withhold and remit 
tax to fulfill their workers’ labor income tax obligations; thus the pattern of remittances 
could be identical to a VAT.  The motivation for introducing these zero-net-tax 
obligations is that, by levying a tax on labor income and requiring individuals to 
complete returns, the tax obligation can be tailored to the individual worker’s situation.  
                                                 
84 The VAT, of course, has its own weaknesses in terms of enforceability.  In recent years a new VAT tax 
evasion scam, called “missing trader fraud” or “carousel fraud,” has spread across much of the VAT-using 
world, especially among EU countries, where goods can be sold between countries without triggering any 
net tax.  In its simplest form, the scheme works this way:  One party imports some good from another VAT 
country, free of tax because of the zero rating of exports.  Then the importer turns around and sells the good 
to a domestic purchaser, charging a price that is somewhat higher than otherwise because of the VAT that 
is owed on the purchase (i.e., because most sales do result in the VAT being paid).  The seller then 
disappears without actually remitting the tax on the sale.  The domestic buyer, innocent and unaware of the 
fraud, may then file for a credit for the tax that should have been remitted by the buyer, only to learn that 
the taxing authority may be unwilling to give the credit for the tax that was not in fact remitted.  See 
generally Richard Pincher, The costs of VAT frauds: Bond House Systems Ltd and Optigen, 5 Brit. Tax 
Rev.  346 (2003).  The carousel concept arises when this arrangement is repeated, with several parties 
buying and selling the same product, with (again) some (though not all) of the parties involved simply 
disappearing without remitting any tax.  The EU tax bar and tax enforcers regard the carousel fraud 
problem as a serious threat to the viability of the VAT as a reliable source of revenue, and some have even 
argued for experimenting with the retail sales tax alternative.  See Michael Keen and Stephen Smith, VAT 
Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?, 59 Nat. Tax J. 861 (2006). What this 
example makes clear is that identifying the lowest-overall cost tax 
 remitter (taking into account administrative costs) is not always an easy task, may defy our easy intuitions, 
and may even be a moving target.  It also suggests the possibility of an expanded role for joint-and-several 
tax liability.  In the carousel fraud example discussed above, this would mean holding the innocent buyer 
liable secondarily for the tax by disallowing their credit if the tax is not remitted by the buyer in the first 
instance.  At least one court has decided, however, that this result is in appropriate and that innocent third 
parties who are caught up in the offending transaction should not be made to remit the tax.  Id.  Our 
framework, however, would suggest that requiring the innocent third parties to remit the tax might come 
closer to approximating the lawmakers’ desired combination of efficiency and distributive outcomes.  The 
argument is comparable to the argument for expanding the wage withholding rules to cover payments to 
independent contractors. 
85 The flat tax proposal is laid out in ROBERT E. HALL AND ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1985).  
Under the tax, there is a business tax base and a personal tax base.  The business tax base is receipts minus 
payments to labor and purchases from other firms.  The personal tax base is receipts of labor income.  
Under the original Hall-Rabushka proposal, both bases are subject to an identical flat rate, and there is an 
exemption for personal income that depends on marital status.   In the example of the preceding footnote, 
under a 10% flat tax with no exemption, Firm A would have  a tax liability of $1, Firm B would have a tax 
liability of $1.50, and there would be labor income tax due of $7.50 (that could be remitted by the firms on 
behalf of the employees), for a total of $10.  
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In particular, each worker can be allocated a fixed exemption of labor income.86  Thus, 
the motivation of moving from a VAT to a Hall-Rabushka flat tax is to allow flexibility 
in implementing progressivity and not, as in the case of moving from a retail sales tax to 
a VAT, to improve administration and enforcement. 
Introducing zero-net-tax remittance obligations and credit entitlements for 
administration and enforcement reasons is the same motivation behind reverse 
withholding requirements, discussed below in section 5d.  These obligations and 
entitlements need not be triggered by exactly the same transactions as the underlying tax 
base; for example, in a VAT the value of any single business-to-business sale, which 
triggers tax remittance obligations and credit entitlements, is not consumption.  Indeed, 
any tax system is defined by the totality of its remittance obligations (and credit 
entitlements), any one of which need not be based on a well-known tax base such as 
aggregate consumption or production.  For example, a tax on aggregate consumption can 
be implemented by levying tax on each act of consumption, or on each firm’s value 
added, knowing that (ignoring foreign trade) aggregate value added equals aggregate 
consumption.  
Now consider again the tort context.  Imagine some harm arises out of the production 
or consumption of a good or service.  We have already argued that, absent administrative 
and enforcement concerns, the tort liability could be placed on the producing firms or the 
consumers with equivalent consequences.  We now see that tort liability could in 
principle be placed on any party doing business with either the producing firms or the 
consumers (or, in the employment context, any party doing business with either the 
employers or the employees) and, furthermore, that the base of any particular liability 
need not be the same as the harm-producing action.  Pursuing the analogy with the VAT, 
if final consumption produces harm, the tort “remittance” liability could be placed not 
only on the retail business and consumer, but also on businesses throughout the 
production and distribution chain that precedes the retail transaction.   
For example, just as a VAT can produce the equivalent level of tax revenue and 
distributional consequences as a retail sales tax, though at lower administrative costs, so 
too imposing tort liability on the parties who are in the lower stages of the chain of 
production of some product (that ultimately causes a third-party harm) can achieve 
equivalent consequences to imposing the harm on the final seller – and may do so at 
relatively low administrative costs.  This is indeed one of the efficiency arguments for 
making strict products liability joint-and-several with respect to retail sellers, 
wholesalers, and manufacturers, including manufacturers of component parts. 
g.  Qualifications 
Our results depend on an assumption that all market participants make decisions on 
the basis of tax-inclusive prices and are not affected by the situational framing of the 
prices or by any other “behavioral” phenomena, such as the endowment effect, that 
would introduce other considerations into their decisions.  If, for example, a worker 
perceives the same after-tax take-home pay of $600 per week differently depending on 
whether the check comes after-tax or whether it comes pre-tax and she must remit the tax, 
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this could affect the amount of labor supplied at a given after-tax wage and our 
conclusions would have to be modified. 
Such behavioral phenomena could also have political economy implications, to the 
extent they affect taxpayer-voters’ perception of the cost of government programs.  There 
is some evidence that tax systems are designed to minimize the perceived burden of a 
given amount of tax liability.87   The politics of income tax withholding in the United 
States suggest that remittance matters, as many conservatives dislike withholding because 
it reduces the visibility of tax collection and thus reduces the perceived cost of 
government.  They prefer that employees, not employers, remit taxes every week or every 
month.  Indeed, some legislators have introduced into Congress a bill entitled the “Cost 
of Government Awareness Act,” which would eliminate withholding and instead require 
individuals to remit income taxes in monthly installments.88  Likewise, the version of the 
Hall-Rabushka flat tax introduced as a bill by then-House Majority Leader Dick Armey 
eliminated employer withholding, which Armey referred to as a “deceptive device that 
has made big government possible.”89   
The remittance rules may also matter in the transition from one tax system to another.  
As an example, consider the consequences of abolishing a retail sales tax.  If tax-
inclusive prices were fixed in the short run, eliminating the retailers’ requirement to remit 
would provide a windfall gain to their owners.  If, alternatively, consumers had been the 
remitting party, they would gain if the tax-inclusive price stayed fixed.  The transition 
gains and losses thus depend critically on the short-run flexibility of prices. 
5.  Applying the Least-Cost-Remitter Idea 
a. Current Law: Tax Withholding, Sales Tax Remittance, and Gift Tax Liability  
Our analysis provides an explanation for a number of aspects of current tax law in the 
U.S. and other countries and suggests some possible reforms.  First, consider wage 
withholding for individual income taxes.  From the perspective of our framework, 
imposing an obligation on the employer to withhold and remit taxes that are based on the 
overall income status of its employees is akin to vicarious employer tax liability.  That is, 
except for the inherent distinctions already discussed between taxes and torts, wage 
withholding is similar in important ways to vicarious employer liability for the harms 
caused by employees.  This analogy not only suggests a rationale for the current income 
tax withholding rules, but also provides an argument for a reasonable expansion of those 
rules – along the lines of expanded employer tort liability discussed above. 
But first let us review the U.S. wage withholding rules in greater detail.  Under the 
U.S. tax system, both the employers and the employees have remittance obligations with 
respect to the taxes owed on, or triggered by, an employee’s income.  The Internal 
                                                 
87 This is discussed in Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price 
Presentation, 10  INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUB. FIN. 189 (2003). 
88 H.R. 1364, 107th Cong. 
89 Dick Armey, Why America Needs the Flat Tax in Robert E. HALL, ALVIN RABUSHKA, DICK ARMEY, 
ROBERT EISNER, AND HERBERT STEIN, FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 99 (1996) (“Only by 
taking people’s money before they ever see it has the government been able to raise taxes to their current 
height without sparking a revolt.” ). 
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Revenue Code, for example, imposes on employers an obligation to “deduct and 
withhold” a given percentage of the employee’s wages as “employment taxes,” to hold 
these funds in trust for the U.S. Treasury (typically in a special account in a bank that is 
qualified to accept tax remittances), and then eventually to remit those funds to the 
government.  Employment taxes include Social Security and Medicare taxes, federal 
unemployment taxes, and federal income taxes.  With respect to the Social Security, 
Medicare, and unemployment taxes, the amounts to be withheld are strictly prescribed by 
law.90  With respect to income tax withholding, although the employee has some say as 
to the amount that is withheld (through the filing of his Form W-4), the rules generall
encourage withholding that approximates an individual employee’s overall income tax 
liability.  If the employee wants to withhold more than the minimal amount, she can do 
that as well, as many wage-earners do, and then file for a refund.       
y 
                                                
Once the employer withholds and subsequently remits the portion of the income tax 
liability for which it is responsible, the employee also has a separate legal responsibility 
to remit any income tax she owes in excess of the amount remitted on her behalf by her 
employer.  That is, if the employer(s) withholds less than the full amount of income tax 
that the employee owes, the employee must then file a tax return by the filing deadline 
with a check for the difference.  This is obviously what many individual taxpayers do 
every year when they send a check in with their 1040s each year.  Of course, if an 
employer withholds and remits more in tax than is owed with respect to the employee’s 
income, the government refunds the excess back to the employee.  Thus both the 
employer and employee have a remittance responsibility with respect to the income tax 
triggered by an individual employee’s income.91 
Note that under current U.S. tax law, if the employer fails to withhold and remit the 
amount required by law from the employee’s wages, the government can seek payment 
for that amount not only from the employer but also from the employee.  Thus, as to the 
employer’s remittance obligation, if the employer fails to withhold and pays the 
employee the pre-tax wage, the employer is the primary obligor and the employee is the 
secondary obligor.  Thus, if the employer does not “deduct and withhold” the amount 
from the employee’s pre-tax wages, that amount is not credited to the employee for 
 
90 In common parlance Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment taxes are typically described as being 
split equally between the employer and the employee – with the employer “owing” half of the tax and the 
employee “owing” the other half.  However, an employer is required to remit both amounts, with the 
employee’s portion being considered an amount deducted and withheld from the employee’s wage.  As 
long as the remittance burden for both amounts is placed on the employer, the two portions of these taxes 
have identical efficiency and distributional effects. 
91 Whenever there are dual remittance obligations of this sort, as compared with a system in which only one 
party has a remittance obligation, then there are obviously two sources (rather than one source) of 
remittance compliance costs.  For example, if we simply eliminated the remittance role for 
employee/individual taxpayers and made no other changes (a system known as final withholding) , this 
would presumably reduce compliance costs compared with the dual remittance regime.  And such a system 
might be optimal if society decided not to allow adjustments for the individual circumstances of employees 
(via various deductions and credits).  Indeed, for some low-income taxpayers who have no itemized 
deduction and who work for only one employer, such a system would have much to recommend it, because 
of the savings in both compliance and administrative costs.  If, however, society does want to allow 
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purposes of her year-end remittance obligation.92  In such a situation, however, if the IRS 
ultimately recovers the tax from the employer for the unwithheld taxes, the employer may 
then seek recovery of that amount from the employee.93  The basis for the employer’s 
claim against the employee would be contractual rather than statutory.  That is, the 
employer implicitly agrees to pay the employee the post-withholding amount; therefore, 
if the employer fails to deduct and withhold, it has in effect overpaid the employee by the 
unwithheld amount and can, contractually, seek recovery for that amount – though 
perhaps unenforceable if the employee proves to be judgment-proof.  This rule is akin to 
joint-and-several liability, in that the government can go after either the employer or the 
employee, with a right of contribution available to the employer if the government ends 
up collecting from it the unwithheld tax.94  
Placing the initial remittance obligation on the employer makes sense from an 
efficiency perspective, both because the employer will generally be the lower-
compliance-cost remitter of the tax (owing to the economies of scale of compliance 
discussed above) and because the employer will be the lower-enforcement-cost remitter 
(owing to the economies of scale of enforcement discussed above).  Likewise, it makes 
sense to allow for recovery from the employee in those cases where the employee is most 
likely to have money with which to pay the tax (namely, where the tax has not in fact 
been withheld from the employee’s wages). 
Our framework would also help to explain the numerous tax withholding rules other 
than those for wage withholding.  For example, under the Internal Revenue Code, there is 
withholding on tips (which are obviously akin to wages)95 as well as on gambling 
winnings.96  In both cases, it is easy to imagine a problem of either judgment proof 
taxpayers or taxpayers who are relatively costly for the tax enforcement authorities to 
pursue.  Likewise, the rules requiring tax withholding by U.S. taxpayers on payments to 
foreign individuals or foreign firms can be seen not so much as a response to the problem 
of insufficiently capitalized taxpayers, but to the problem of missing (or beyond the reach 
of our government) taxpayers.97  Indeed, other countries make even greater use of 
withholding regimes than does the U.S., often requiring payers to withhold and remit 
                                                 
92 Church v. CIR, 810 F2d 19 (2d Cir. 1987) ; Goins v. CIR, 75 TCM (CCH) 1243 (1998) ; Edwards v. 
CIR, 39 TC 78 (1962), aff'd, 323 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1963). 
93 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note __, at 111.5.   
94 It is not exactly like joint-and-several liability in practice.  It is more like primary and secondary liability, 
as the Government always goes after the employer first for the amounts that were supposed to be withheld, 
and then would go after the employee only if that were unsuccessful.  In contrast, with joint-and-several, 
the plaintiff can literally choose whichever joint tortfeasor it wants to go after. 
95 Tips present even bigger noncompliance problems than with wages generally.  Indeed, tips are such a 
problem that the Code now requires large restaurants not only to withhold for tips, but also to report to the 
IRS for each member of their wait staff an allocated amount of the restaurant’s overall revenue.  See 
generally Yoram Margalioth, The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 117 (2006) (arguing in 
favor of moving towards service charges and away from tipping for a number of reasons, including 
concerns about tax evasion). 
96 See generally IRS, Publication 505, Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax, available on line at 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p505/index.html.  
97 See generally IRS, Publication 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities, 
available on line at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p515.pdf. 
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taxes on domestic interest and dividend payments as well as on payments to independent 
contractors of various sorts.98   
Even some U.S. states require tax withholding in situations in which the U.S. federal 
tax law does not.  For example, both Minnesota and Massachusetts require withholding 
for payments to certain types of independent contractors, which under U.S. federal tax 
law would not be subject to withholding.  In Minnesota it is payments to certain 
construction-industry contractors,99 and in Massachusetts it is payments to certain 
visiting performers and lecturers.100  In both cases, it is clear that the concern is w
administrative cost of enforcing tax compliance with these groups of payees.  Our 
framework suggests that, because of the incidence analysis discussed above, imposing the 
remittance obligation in all of these cases on the larger party (who is easier or cheaper to 
target with enforcement efforts) comes closest to efficiently achieving the policymaker’s 
desired level of revenue subject to distributional considerations. 
ith the 
                                                
A similar story can be used to explain why governments that use retail sales taxes 
invariably assign the primary remittance obligation to the retail sellers rather than retail 
purchasers.  There are obvious economies of scale to enforcing sales tax remittances 
against large retail sellers rather than against hundreds or thousands of individual 
purchasers.  It would be the height of folly to insist on auditing every individual who 
makes a retail purchase at a Wal-Mart store in a given year rather than simply to audit the 
store itself.  This is because, to apply our framework, Wal-Mart is obviously a lower-cost 
tax remitter than would be its customers.  To illustrate the futility of imposing the retail 
sales tax remittance obligation on retail purchasers, consider the much-maligned “use” 
tax.  When a consumer purchases goods by mail order, Internet, or otherwise from 
outside the state, the state government will often impose a so-called use tax (charged at 
the same rate as the retail sales tax) to be remitted by the purchaser if the seller does not 
remit the tax on the purchaser’s behalf.  Unsurprisingly, the compliance rate for such use 
taxes is generally thought to be close to zero.101  Indeed, this is one of the reasons why 
more states are increasingly seeking to impose a sales-tax remittance obligation on online 
out-of-state retail sellers such as Amazon and iTunes, despite the potential constitutional 
objections.102        
Another example of current tax remittance law that seems roughly consistent with the 
framework of this article is in the area of gift transfers.  Gifts, whether inter vivos 
transfers or bequests, are not generally thought of as market transfers.  Indeed, to be 
treated as a gift for tax purposes the transfers cannot be accompanied by the same sort of 
 
98 Germany is one example.  See JUHANI KESIT, EUROPEAN TAX HANDBOOK 245 (2006). 
99 Minnesota now requires taxpayers to withhold and remit taxes on amounts paid to certain contractors in 
the construction trade, if the total payments for the year are expected to exceed a certain threshold.  
Minnesota Statute Section 290.92, Subd. 31. For a description of this new rule (effective beginning January 
1, 2009), see http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/withholding/tax_information/factsheets/wfs18_08.pdf. 
100 Massachusetts requires withholding and remittance for taxes on payments to performers, visiting 
lecturers, and the like.  See generally http://www.mass.gov/Ador/docs/dor/Publ/PDFS/performers.pdf. 
101 See, e.g., Trymaine Lee, State Steps Up Efforts to Collect a Sales Tax Owed by More in a Digital Age, 
N.Y. Times, April 15, 2008 (Noting that “only 5 percent of the approximately 9.6 million residents who 
filed [New York] state income tax returns for 2006 listed anything owed” on the line for the use tax on their 
returns.) 
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quid pro quo normally associated with market exchange.  Therefore, it could be argued 
that TRIPs would have no application to the gift context.  On the other hand, it is not 
unusual to think of gifts as involving some element of reciprocity, and economists have 
usefully modeled gifts and bequests as a type of exchange, with the donor expecting 
something in return from the donee, albeit not necessarily as a result of any explicit 
contract.  In any event, it would not stretch the underlying idea of TRIPs beyond 
recognition to apply it to the gift/bequest context and thus to argue that, under traditional 
(extreme) Coasean and TRIPs assumptions, the assignment of the gift/bequest tax 
remittance obligation should not make a difference.  Either way, the donor will adjust the 
amount of the gift to achieve a given desired amount of after-tax transfer to the donee.  
Likewise, an application of this Article’s framework would suggest that, insofar as there 
are differential compliance and administrative costs, the assignment of gift/estate tax 
remittance responsibility may matter.  The choice of the optimal assignment of that 
responsibility would depend on the answer to the question we have repeatedly posed:  
what assignment of tax remittance liability achieves the desired revenue raising and 
distributional goals at the lowest combined administrative and compliance costs? 
Under current U.S. tax law, the initial or primary tax remittance obligation rests with 
the giver or the estate.  The amount of the tax is determined by the amount of the donor’s 
tax base (total gift transfers less various deductions less a lifetime unified credit) times 
the applicable rate structure, which is fairly progressive.  Once the donor has given more 
than the excluded amount, the unified gift/estate tax kicks in, and the donor must remit 
the tax.  Of course, we could imagine a system where the amount of tax was calculated in 
exactly the same way, but the remittance obligation would be assigned to the donee.  
Indeed, under current law, the donee is secondarily liable for the gift/estate tax, for which 
the donor is primarily liable. This is not joint and several liability, but rather primary and 
secondary liability.  That is, if the donor does not pay the liability, the donee must pay it.  
This primary/secondary assignment of tax liability is entirely a question of remittance 
obligation.  Either way, the amount is a function of the base of total gifts and bequests 
that exceed the exemption.  (Thus, as we have already emphasized, the calculation of the 
amount of the tax can be divorced from the question of remittance obligation.)  By 
contrast, if the amount of the tax were calculated by reference to the donee’s tax base 
(say, by including the gift/bequest in the donee’s gross income), we could likewise 
imagine various alternative assignments of the remittance responsibility:  primary 
liability for the donee with secondary liability for the donor; the reverse; joint and several 
liability; several liability; and so on.  Whatever the remittance assignment, however, the 
amount of the tax would be the same – and, presumably, whatever the remittance 
responsibility, we would call this an inheritance tax rather than an estate tax. 
The framework of this Article suggests that, whatever base is chosen, the remittance 
obligation ought to be designed to, ceteris paribus,  minimize compliance and 
administrative costs.  Given the choice of the tax base under current law, the current 
assignment of remittance responsibility seems reasonably sensible.  The idea presumably 
is that donors, or their fiduciaries, generally are the lowest compliance cost remitters, 
which would indeed be so in many cases.  Think of a large estate that pays out sums to 
many different beneficiaries; in such a case, compliance and administrative costs could 
presumably be minimized by assigning initial primary remittance liability on the donor.  
 49
48
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 96 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art96
The remittance by the estate in that case can even be thought of as a sort of withholding 
regime. 
Also consistent with our least-cost-remitter rationale is the fact that the remittance 
responsibility under U.S. income tax law, as well as under ever other tax regime we are 
aware of (including various forms of consumption tax), is largely nontransferable.  That 
is, tax laws generally do not allow Coeasean bargaining with respect to who has the tax 
remittance obligation.  Put differently, the parties to the transactions that trigger taxation 
are not generally allowed to elect which of them will be responsible for remitting the tax. 
There are some exceptions to this rule.  As mentioned above, individual employees can 
submit W4 forms requesting the employer not to withhold any tax from their checks, but 
this will be largely ineffective.  The IRS will scrutinize such requests closely and will not 
permit such an allocation of remittance responsibility solely to the individual employee if 
it appears to be abusive.  Why not?  For just the sort of enforcement-cost reasons that we 
have been discussing, which are analogous to the concerns about strategic judgment-
proofing from the tort context.  That is, if buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in 
Coasean bargaining over the allocation of the tax remittance responsibility, there would 
be an incentive for them to allocate that responsibility not necessarily to the one with the 
lowest compliance costs (which would be socially optimal) but to the one with the best 
chance of evading the tax – and thus the party for whom the government’s cost of 
enforcing a given tax liability is highest.  Using the modified Calebreisan language, they 
would not necessarily choose the least-cost harm avoider, but would also consider who is 
the least-cost liability avoider, which is the highest-enforcement-cost remitter. This sort 
of bargain would be joint-wealth maximizing for the parties involved, but may not be 
socially optimal.  Hence, it is no surprise that tax remittance obligations are not generally 
made transferable.  (Indeed, if they were transferable, one can imagine that retail sellers 
would seek quickly to shift the remittance responsibility for the sales tax from themselves 
to their customers, many of whom would have an incentive happily to accept that 
responsibility, just as they do the – effectively unenforceable – remittance obligation for 
the use tax.) 
b.  Potential Reform: Expanding the Remittance Role of (Large) 
Employers/Payers 
As discussed in the previous section, U.S. tax law imposes on employers not only the 
obligation to submit information returns to the IRS regarding the wages they pay their 
employees (i.e., Form W-2s, which include information about the amount paid and the 
identity of the payee) but also the obligation to withhold and remit taxes on those wages.  
By contrast, with respect to payments made to independent contractors (ICs), although 
there is a reporting obligation (Form 1099s, requiring information similar to W-2s), the 
remittance obligation rests with the payee rather than the payer.  Why the different 
treatment for ICs?  Under the framework of this article, the assignment of remittance 
responsibility to ICs rather than employers has some initial plausibility if we consider 
only compliance costs.  In many situations, as between employers and their ICs, the latter 
would incur lower overall compliance costs.  This is because, unlike employees (who 
tend to work for relatively few employers, usually a single employer), some independent 
contractors often work for multiple employers.  Thus, rather than require multiple 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009
information provided on the Form W-4 that enables the withholding amount to be 
tailored to the circumstances of the individual), it minimizes compliance costs in those 
cases to let the contractor sort out its own tax remittance obligations.   
This does not mean, of course, that the employer/payer is given no tax compliance-
enforcement role with respect to independent contractors.  The filing of information 
returns with the IRS lowers the cost of enforcing the tax laws against the contractors, by 
giving the Service a means of cross-referencing returns to ensure proper remittance.  
Thus, in theory, the line between employees and independent contractors could be 
appropriate in that it allows the remittance obligation to be assigned to the least-cost 
remitter while imposing a reporting obligation on payers as a means of keeping the tax 
remitters honest.  
But that is not the end of the story.  First, contractors will sometimes have a higher 
compliance cost than will employers.  This could be the case, for example, when the 
contractors work for only one employer (or only a few employers) and happen to be 
classified as an independent contractor merely because of the definition of that status.   
Also, if the employer is significantly larger than the contractor, there would be economies 
of scale of the sort described above to placing remittance responsibility on the employer.  
In addition, for the reasons already discussed, the administrative costs of enforcing 
remittance compliance against ICs, especially small ones (most especially self-employed 
individuals), turns out to be very high; and this may be true even with information 
reporting from the payers.  With small independent contractors, especially those who are 
self-employed individuals who work for larger companies but happen to have 
independent contractor status, there is a significant possibility of judgment-proofness.  In 
such cases, even the filing of an accurate Form 1099 by the employer will not ensure 
compliance.  That is, insofar as the worker is judgment proof, an increase in information 
reporting does not reduce administrative costs.  For those individuals, then, the fact that 
their payments are not called “wages” does not diminish the concern that led to the 
adoption of a pay-as-you-earn wage withholding in the first place.  For these reasons, 
assigning the remittance obligation to contractors rather than to employers has the 
potential to result in substantial tax evasion (with all of the efficiency and distributional 
consequences that such evasion implies) or, if the government decides to crack down, 
very substantial enforcement costs. 
This is not a hypothetical problem.  By far the largest source of tax noncompliance in 
the U.S. lies with self-employed taxpayers.  Evidence from the IRS National Research 
Program for tax year 2001 shows a huge variation in the rate of misreporting as a 
percentage of actual income by type of income or income offsets (such as deductions).  
For example, only one percent of wages and salaries, and only four percent of taxable 
interest and dividends, go unreported.  Of course, wages, salaries, interest, and dividends 
must all be reported to the IRS by those who pay them; in addition, wages and salaries 
are subject to employer withholding.  Self-employment business income, by contrast, is 
subject to relatively little information reporting, and the estimated noncompliance rate for 
that sort of income is sharply higher.  An estimated 57 percent of non-farm proprietor 
income (which includes independent contractors) is not reported, which by itself accounts 
for more than a third of the total estimated underreporting for the individual income 
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tax.103  Over half of the individual income tax underreporting gap is attributable to the 
underreporting of business income, of which non-farm proprietor self-employed income 
is the largest component.104    
Of course, some significant fraction of this self-employed tax gap is attributable to 
individuals (or small-scale businesses involving several individuals) who sell goods or 
services directly to retail consumers.  For noncompliance in those settings, there are 
serious limitations on what the law can do by way of either altering the remittance 
obligations or introducing new reporting requirements.  The compliance and 
administrative costs of requiring individual consumers either to withhold and remit or 
even to file information returns on consumption expenditures for federal income tax 
purposes would obviously be prohibitive.   (Again, this is why retail sellers rather than 
purchasers are generally required to remit state retail sales taxes.)  However, in those 
cases in which self-employed individuals (or even small businesses that involve more 
than one individual) work for a single – or for relatively few – business employers and 
they happen to be characterized as independent contractors under the common law 
definition used by the tax law, there may be some potential efficiency and distributive 
advantages to a change in remittance law. 
Specifically, a good case can be made for expanding the withholding and remittance 
obligation to include payments by (relatively large) businesses to (relatively small) 
independent contractors.105  The obvious benefit of such a rule would be essentially the 
same as wage withholding and remittance: to improve compliance or, alternatively, to 
reduce the administrative cost of achieving a given level of compliance.  That is, the pay-
as-you-earn concerns that motivated the adoption of wage withholding in the first place 
apply just as much to payments to individual or small-scale business contractors as they 
do to wage earners.106  Such proposals have been made before.  For example, the General 
Accounting Office in 1992 issued a report calling for, among other things, a new system 
                                                 
103 Data available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf. 
104Id.   What these data do not reveal is what fraction of the non-farm proprietor income derives from self-
employed individuals, for whom the judgment proof and pay-as-you-earn arguments are strongest, and 
what fraction derives from relatively large (non-judgment-proof) independent contractor businesses.  For 
the latter category of taxpayers, it could be argued that, rather than impose a new remittance obligation on 
employers, the more efficient overall response to noncompliance would be to increase information 
reporting on the part of employer-payers, perhaps by increasing penalties for non-filing of 1099s. 
105 Note the similarity of this to the practice in some countries of requiring sales tax to be remitted by 
certain parties in conjunction with certain purchases from small businesses, on the grounds that these 
payments presumably reflect or indicate taxable income of the recipient.  In a few cases, there is “reverse” 
withholding, under which tax must be remitted in conjunction with certain sales to small business 
taxpayers.  Here the link to income is less direct, although arguably there is an indirect relation, if the 
transaction is expected to result in taxable profits, as when importers, wholesalers, or retailers, purchase 
goods for resale.  Similarly, as mentioned in the text above, some countries require withholding and 
remittance by payers on payments to independent contractors.  See Kesti, European Tax Handbook, supra.  
These withholding remittances can in principle be credited against the income tax liability of the small 
businesses, but the presumption is that these businesses often are not in the tax net, i.e., are not filing tax 
returns and remitting any tax liability.  Countries that require withholding on payments to certain 
businesses usually exclude as withholding agents individuals in their capacity as consumers and small 
businesses because they are too numerous and otherwise not suitable as withholding agents.  
106 Under current law, payments to corporations are not subject to withholding, but obviously that rule 
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of non-wage contractor withholding.107  Most recently, the Office of the National 
Taxpayer Advocate, which identified the underreporting of self-employment income as 
one of its primary areas of concern (listing only the AMT as a larger tax-related problem 
for U.S. taxpayers), recommended contractor withholding, with specific withholding 
percentages to be set, by Congress or the Treasury Department, for different categories of 
contractor-payees.108  Such a change would obviously have some disadvantages, as the 
compliance costs might be too large for relatively small business payers, which is why 
there should be an exception for businesses below a given size.  Of course, contractor 
compliance could be improved and enforced costs reduced also by strengthening the rules 
regarding information reporting, such as by increasing the penalties for failure to report.   
However, to the extent that many self-employed individuals will be either judgment proof 
or otherwise relative expensive to prosecute, some version of contractor non-wage 
withholding may make sense.  
One important implication of our analysis is that, if a contractor withholding regime 
were adopted, it should not be made elective, just as the assignment of tort liability 
among various joint tortfeasors should not be elective.  That is, contractor withholding is 
another one of those areas where Coasean bargaining would tend to exploit externalities 
rather than internalize them, as the parties would have an incentive to assign the 
remittance obligation to the least-cost liability avoider rather than to the lowest-
compliance cost remitter.  Indeed, under current law, it would be possible for businesses 
and their contractors to enter into voluntary withholding arrangements whereby the 
businesses agreed to withhold and remit on their contractor payments.109  But it should 
come as no shock that such agreements have not become the norm for contractor 
payments. 
An alternative to introducing contractor withholding would be for Treasury to be 
empowered to define and police the doctrinal boundaries between employees and 
independent contractors.  As the law presently stands, the distinction depends on the 
common law definition derived from agency law, which, though possibly useful in the 
tort context, proves to be unhelpful in the tax context.  A better way to draw the line 
would be to impose the remittance obligation on the party who is likely to produce the 
lowest combination of compliance and administrative costs.  For the reasons already 
discussed, that will usually be the employer in cases in which the employer is a large 
corporation and the worker is an individual (or even a small firm).  Drawing the optimal 
line between employer remittance and independent contractor remittance would require 
careful study of the relative compliance and administrative costs.  This is just the sort of 
job that would normally be assigned to the Treasury Department, which could be tasked 
with designing regulations that would make structure optimal remittance obligations.  
Unfortunately, as a result of section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, the Treasury 
                                                 
107 General Accounting Office, Tax Administration: Approaches for Improving Independent Contractor 
Compliance (July 23, 1992). 
108 The report suggests starting with a withholding rate of 3.5 percent on payments to independent 
contractors who generally maintain “an inventory or receiving payments for materials and supplies” and 5 
percent for contractors who do not, but then allowing the Treasury Department to determine appropriate 
contractor withholding rates for different categories of contractors based on the average costs of doing 
business in those areas.  Similar proposals have been floated before.  See, e.g., 1992 GAO report. 
109 See I.R.C. section 3402 (authorizing such agreements). 
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Department is prohibited from publishing regulations and revenue rulings with respect to 
the employment status of any individual for purposes of the employment taxes.110  One 
concrete recommendation that flows from our analysis is that this prohibition should be 
lifted and the Treasury Department should be allowed to draw a line between employer 
remittance and worker remittance that makes tax policy sense – that minimizes overall 
compliance and administrative costs.     
  
c. The Limits of Vicarious Employer Tax Liability:  Scope of Employment  
In the preceding analysis, we have borrowed ideas from the literature on vicarious tort 
liability to suggest ways in which an analogous efficiency argument can be used to justify 
what amounts to vicarious employer tax liability for the taxes owed by employees.  That 
is, because of the asymmetric cost of enforcing tax remittance obligations imposed on 
workers (at least when the workers are individuals – whether employees or independent 
contractors – or small companies and the employers are relatively large companies), an 
efficiency story can be told for placing the remittance obligation on the employer rather 
than on the worker.  (As we have emphasized, this fact is inconsistent with the tax 
remittance invariance propositions that are conventional wisdom among economists.)  
Here we discuss whether this idea of vicarious employer tax liability should be limited by 
a tax version of the scope-of-employment doctrine.  
Recall from the discussion in 3.c. above the nature of the scope-of-employment 
doctrine in tort law:  It says that employers can be held vicariously and strictly liable for 
the torts of their employees only insofar as those workers commit torts within the scope 
of their work for the employer.  The efficiency justification for the rule is that the 
employer is not the best insurer of the employee’s non-job-related liabilities; and 
imposing those costs on employers would inefficiently reduce the scale of the employer’s 
enterprise.  The counter-argument is that perhaps the employer might be, in some cases, 
the best insurer of such risks and might even be, if not the cheapest-cost harm avoider, 
someone who is in a position to “bribe” the cheapest-cost harm avoider (probably the 
worker) to do just that—avoid the harm.   
What would the tax analog of vicarious tax liability with a scope-of-employment 
limitation look like?  It might look very much like the current system for withholding and 
remittance for Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes.  For those 
taxes, the employer is required to withhold and remit an amount that is calculated based 
exclusively on the wage paid by that employer to that employee.111  Thus, in a sense, 
those tax remittances are presently limited to the scope of employment, as they is 
calculated by applying the relevant rates exclusively to the wages paid by the employer 
with the remittance responsibility.  As a result, if a worker receives wages from more 
than one employer, each employer is responsible for remitting (only) the employment 
taxes that are attributable to the wage that they pay that worker.   
                                                 
110 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (providing guidance with respect to section 530 of the Revenue Act of 
1978). 
111 A portion of the tax is formally “owed” by the employer and a portion is “owed” by the employee.  
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What would the tax analog of vicarious tax liability without a scope-of-employment 
limitation look like?  Interestingly, it might look something like the current rule for 
income tax withholding in the U.S.  With income tax withholding, the idea is that, in 
most cases, the employer will withhold and remit enough money to cover the individual 
taxpayer’s entire income tax liability, not merely the income tax liability generated by the 
wage paid to that employee by that employer.112  In general, as a first approximation, the 
law allows employers to withhold in income tax the amount that their employees tell 
them to withhold, that is, whatever amount is determined by the employee’s Form W-4, 
which lists the number of exemptions to be used in calculating the withholding amount.  
Indeed, an employee can request that no income tax whatsoever be withheld.  However, 
if the withheld amount proves to be too low (and does not at least approximate the 
employee’s overall tax liability), the IRS has the power to send the employer what is 
called a “lock-in” letter, which will require the employer to withhold an amount that 
more closely approximates the employee’s true tax liability.  If the employer fails to 
enforce the lock-in withholding amount, the IRS will collect the difference from the 
employer.113  Indeed, the lock-in withholding amount probably often results in 
overwithholding and the need for the employee to file for a refund.   
Of course, employees who have both employment income and non-employment (or 
self-employment) income can avoid the compulsory lock-in withholding by simply filing 
estimated tax returns and remitting the tax liability triggered by the other income.  But 
they have to pay the extra tax.  What the employer and employee cannot do – at least not 
without the possible consequence of the lock-in letter – is to collude (in one of those 
nefarious Coasean tax externalizing transactions) to shift all of the remittance 
responsibility to the employee, who then fails to pay the tax.  The combination of 
information reporting (on Form W-2s) and lock-in letters deter this possibility.  The key 
observation is that, under present withholding regulations with respect to federal income 
tax withholding, the general rule is that employers are expected to remit (i.e., are held 
vicariously liable for) tax owed by the employee not only on income triggered by the 
work with the employer but also from income generated outside of the employment 
context – unless the tax on other income is paid via separate estimated tax payments.  
And this regime is considered neither controversial nor unusual, even though it is a form 
of expanded—and vicarious—employer tax liability.   
 
d.  In Rem Taxation 
                                                 
112 Taxpayers are encouraged to submit W4 forms that fine-tune the exemptions so that this result is 
approximately achieved.  For example, on the IRS web page, there is a withholding calculator that takes the 
employee-taxpayer through a number of questions designed to help him arrive at a withholding amount that 
approximates not merely the tax triggered by the wages paid by the employer, but the overall likely tax 
liability of the employee-taxpayer from all sources. 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96196,00.html.  For taxpayers who have employed spouses, the 
IRS web page suggests that the online calculator will produce only a approximation of the appropriate tax 
remittance.  Of course, as with the Form W4, the answer produced by this calculator is relatively easy to 
manipulate simply by inflating the number of dependency exemptions.  However, as discussed in the text 
immediately below, the law has ways of policing such abuse. 
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To this point we have been focusing on the tax remittance analog to tort liability, and 
for the most part we have been concentrating on income taxes, with some discussion of 
sales or other consumption taxes.  Turning briefly now to property taxes, we see an 
example of a very different sort of remittance regime, but one that has obvious Coasean 
roots:  in rem taxation – or taxation “against the property.”  All individual and sales taxes 
are, in the first instance, in personam liabilities in the following sense:  They are initially 
enforceable against the person who is the remitter (or, if there are multiple or overlapping 
remittance obligations, enforceable against the remitters).  Of course, even with income 
taxes, if the person with the remittance obligation fails to remit, the taxing authority can 
convert that personal liability into a claim against taxpayer’s personal and real property – 
an in rem liability.114  With an in rem tax liability, as with any in rem liability, the 
obligation “runs with the land.”  Thus, if the property is transferred and the in rem tax 
liability has not been satisfied, that liability follows the property; and the party to whom 
the in rem liability is owed, here the government, has the power to force a foreclosure 
sale to satisfy the obligation.  One difference between an in rem and an in personam 
liability is that if an individual who is personally liable goes through a personal 
bankruptcy proceeding, her in personam liabilities will be eliminated; whereas, in rem 
liabilities, again not being personal liabilities, remain enforceable.  Thus, the remedy that 
is available to the in rem creditor, here the government, would be seizure and sale of the 
property.      
How are these in rem tax liabilities enforced?  Normally the taxing authority will 
have on file the name of one party who is primarily responsible for remitting the tax, the 
party to whom the periodic tax bill is sent.  This is usually the owner of the property.  If 
the owner fails to pay the tax, the tax collector can then initiate steps to foreclose on the 
property.  Notice may also be sent to other parties with an interest in the property, who 
may have the option to pay the delinquent tax and assume ownership of the property.  In 
any event, as the foreclosure process goes forward, all parties with a financial interest in 
the property become aware of that fact.  And through a public auction, the property will 
eventually end up in the hands of the highest-valued user.115   
What does all of this have to do with optimal tax remittance policy?  In fact, in rem 
tax liability amounts to a sort of modified joint-and-several liability for the tax that is 
attributable to a given piece of property.  That is, the tax collector (like the tort plaintiff) 
can in effect bring its cause of action against any party with an interest in the property in 
question, whichever one has the deepest pocket or is otherwise easiest, or cheapest, to 
identify.  In rem tax liability, of course, is not exactly like joint-and-several liability, 
                                                 
114 In fact, as mentioned in note __ above, with U.S. federal income, gift, or estate taxes, the U.S. 
government automatically receives a lien against all the assets of a taxpayer if the taxpayer does not pay the 
taxes upon “demand.”  IRC § 6321. 
115 As John Youngman explains, two of the consequences that may be intended by terming a tax in rem are 
(i) that assessments may name the property but not rely on the identification of the owner to establish tax 
liability, so that publication may be deemed to notify all interested parties of this claim, and (ii) there may 
be a corresponding absence of personal liability, the remedy for nonpayment being limited to seizure and 
sale of the property itself. See Joan Youngman, Tax on Land and Buildings, in Tax Law Design and 
Drafting (1996) (Victor Thuronyi, Ed.). Youngman counsels against in rem taxes that limit the liability, and 
favors listing as liable for remittance obligation anyone “owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling” an 
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since none of the potential remitters (and potential owners of the property) would be held 
personally liable.  However, because of their financial interests in the tax-encumbered 
property, they would have an incentive, at least to the extent of their financial stake, to 
pay the outstanding tax liability.  The protection in this situation against potentially 
judgment-proof taxpayers, of course, is not their personal deep pockets, but the value of 
the property subject to the tax liens.  Thus, in rem tax liability provides an alternative to 
deep-pocket vicarious tax liability as a response to the sorts of compliance obstacles we 
have been discussing.  What’s more, as we have noted, this sort of in rem liability is in 
fact already present not only for local property taxes, but also for federal income taxes, in 
circumstances in which the taxpayers in question have assets that can be attached.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
Two venerable but heretofore parallel scholarly traditions, tax remittance 
invariance propositions and Coasean variance and invariance assertions in a market 
context, share much in common.  In both settings an equilibrating price will determine 
which side of the market bears the costs, either of a harm or a tax obligation, and in both 
settings there is the possibility of “off-market” negotiation that will reach private-cost 
reducing agreements.   
The two traditions differ in the centrality for the TRIPs of the enforcement of 
remittance obligations by the government.  In contract law, for example, the presumption 
that maximizing joint benefit is efficient presumes that there are no third parties involved, 
but introducing a third party is not central.  In tax the third party (the government, as an 
agent for all citizens) is central, and in particular bargains that reduce joint compliance 
costs may, by increasing the enforcement costs of raising revenue, not be socially 
optimal.  To clarify that difference, we introduce the semantic distinction between the 
least-cost harm avoider, a modification of a standard term in tort analysis that 
corresponds to tax compliance costs, and the least-cost liability avoider, which is 
critically important in tax because the private cost saving due to evasion of tax liability 
does not correspond to a social cost saving, and in fact entails additional enforcement 
costs.  
This new framework allows us to make a number of observations about current 
tax remittance law and some tentative suggestions about potential reforms.  The 
assignment of the remittance burden to employers rather than employees and to retail 
sellers rather than consumers are obvious examples of placing tax liability on the least-
overall-cost tax remitter.  Our emphasis on remittance regimes is not meant to diminish 
the importance of information reporting.  However, in some situations – where pay-as-
you-earn (judgment proof) or “missing taxpayer” concerns are high – information 
reporting alone will not be enough, and just as the judgment proof problem may justify 
vicarious liability in tort, a related phenomenon may suggest the need for a sort of 
vicarious or joint tax liability in some settings.  Indeed, we argue that this idea could be 
taken further than it has been, for example, with the introduction of withholding for 
payments to contractors – a reform that would directly respond to what is by far the 
largest source of tax noncompliance under the U.S. tax laws: under-reporting of self-
employed and small business income. 
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